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NEW YORK CITY'S FAIR SHARE CRITERIA
AND THE COURTS: AN ATTEMPT
TO EQUITABLY REDISTRIBUTE THE
BENEFITS AND BURDENS ASSOCIATED
WITH MUNICIPAL FACILITIES
New York City recently embarked on a bold plan designed to
bring a greater degree of equity and fairness to official land-use
decision making.1 In 1990, the newly adopted city charter called for
the mayor and the City Planning Commission to develop criteria that
would guide the city in fairly distributing the benefits and burdens
associated with municipal facilities. 2  The "Fair Share Criteria,"3
developed pursuant to this charter mandate, were a response to both
the perception and the reality of an overconcentration of municipal
facilities in the city's various communities.'
New York City, like every other government entity, must
construct various types of facilities in order to provide services to its
citizens.' These facilities include police stations and libraries, which
benefit a particular community without imposing any undue burdens
1 See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER § 203 (effective May 2, 1990).
2 id.
' The official name of the criteria mandated by the new city charter is the "Criteria
for the Location of City Facilities." See OFFICIAL COMPILATION OF THE RULES OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, Title 62, app. A (Lenz & Riecker eds., 1994). Because they
represent principles of equitable distribution of municipal facilities, they became known
as the "Fair Share Criteria," and will be referred to in this manner throughout this Note.
' See id.; William Valletta, Siting Public Facilities on a Fair Share Basis in New
York City, 25 URB. LAW. 1, 2 (1993) (discussing how communities often perceive
themselves as being over-saturated with municipal facilities); Vicki Been, What's
Fairness Got to do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable
Land Uses, 6 CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1007 (1993) (discussing the reality of an undue
concentration of burdensome facilities in poor and minority-populated communities).
The Fair Share Criteria lists various types of municipal facilities that are covered
by the siting guidelines contained within them. See Fair Share Criteria attachments A-C.
Some of these facilities are branch libraries, community health care centers, day care
centers, mental health services, fire stations, police precincts, parks, administrative
offices, airports, sewage treatment plants, group homes, hospices, transitional housing,
halfway houses, prisons, and nursing homes. Id.
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on it.6 But the facilities that the city must build also include trash
incinerators and prisons, which benefit the city as a whole while
imposing great burdens, such as increased traffic and pollution, on
particular communities.7 The construction of this latter group of
facilities is inevitably opposed by communities being burdened by
them; therefore, determining construction locations for burdensome
facilities is a major dilemma for city planners. 8
The reason for the opposition to the siting of burdensome
facilities is obvious-no one wants an incinerator that emits foul
odors and noxious smoke next door to one's house, or a residence for
the mentally disturbed in one's neighborhood if it already has several
similar residences.9 This type of opposition, called the "not in my
backyard" syndrome,1" is often based on the perception that a
neighborhood is saturated with more than its fair share of burdensome
facilities.'1 This perception, however, is often false, because it is
based on a community's lack of information, fear, or prejudice.' 2
Community opposition usually arises when these types of facilities are closed down.
See, e.g., Brower v. Koch, 572 N.Y.S.2d 329 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1991) (concerning
a community's motion to enjoin the closing of several fire battalions; motion denied
because the city complied with community notice requirements); Lower East Side Joint
Planning Council v. Dinkins, No. 40566 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 25, 1991), reprinted in
N.Y. L.J., Oct. 29, 1991, at 22 (holding that the Fair Share Criteria did not apply
retroactively to a determination to close a fire house made before the Criteria were
promulgated).
7 See Been, supra note 4, at 1002 n.4 (discussing the burdens placed on communities
by "locally undesirable land uses").
' See generally Peter Margulies, Building Communities of Virtue: Political Theory,
Land Use Policy and the "Not in My Backyard" Syndrome, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 945,
957 (1992) (discussing the reasons for communities' reluctance to being the sites for
municipal facilities, and the urban planning difficulties that result from this reluctance).
I See Been, supra note 4, at 1002 n.4 (explaining some of the common burdens and
nuisances, such as noise and air pollution, placed on communities by "locally undesirable
land uses").
10 See Margulies, supra note 8, at 965 (explaining the real and purely perceptual
causes of the "not in my backyard" syndrome).
11 "The Fair Share Criteria are intended to respond to the public perception that
certain neighborhoods in the city have become 'over-saturated' with undesirable
facilities." Valletta, supra note 4, at 1.
12 See Margulies, supra note 8, at 960 (contending that the "not in my backyard"
syndrome is rooted in a community's fear of outsiders, and an innate resistance to
governmental decision making).
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New York City's Fair Share Criteria seek to correct this often false
perception of a community being oversaturated with burdensome
facilities in various ways, such as by opening up the site selection
process to public involvement, stimulating ,dialogues with
communities slated for the construction of facilities, and justifying the
city's site selection determinations by following detailed selection
guidelines. 13
The Fair Share Criteria, besides being public relations tools
to correct false perceptions, also attempt to correct the reality, that
most burdensome facilities are located in poor and minority-populated
communities. An ugly fact of life in New York City, and the rest of
the nation, is that most unwanted, oppressive facilities end up in
poor, predominately black and Hispanic communities. 4 Whatever the
reasons for this condition, its inequity is self-evident. Those who are
unable to enjoy society's benefits should not be forced to live with a
disproportionate amount of society's burdens, represented by the
adverse physical, mental and environmental effects associated with
living in close proximity to facilities such as toxic waste dumps,
incinerators, homeless shelters, and prisons." The responsibility for
redistributing the burdens and benefits associated with municipal
facilities inevitably falls on the government. 6 New York City has
'3 See infra part II.A-B; Valletta, supra note 4, at 2.
14 See generaly John C. Chambers & Alyssa Senzel, Our Racist Environment;
Discrimination Leaves Mark in Site Choices, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 12, 1994, at S27
(discussing various studies which have found that most environmentally burdensome
facilities are located in minority-populated communities).
"5 The. equitable distribution of municipal facilities among all communities is the
driving force behind the development and implementation of the Fair Share Criteria. See
NEW YORK CrrY CHARTER § 203(a) ("The [Fair Share] criteria shall be designed to
further the fair distribution among communities of the burdens and benefits associated
with city facilities ...with due regard for the social and economic impacts of such
facilities upon the areas surrounding the sites.").
IS The New Jersey Supreme Court, in voiding local zoning regulations that prevented
the poor from living in certain municipalities, clearly articulated the government's
responsibility to eliminate society's land-use inequities:
IThe State controls use of land, all of the land. In exercising that
control it cannot favor rich over poor. It cannot legislatively set
aside dilapidated housing in urban ghettos for the poor and decent
housing elsewhere for everyone else. The government that controls
this land represents everyone. While the State may not have the
ability to eliminate poverty, it cannot use that condition as the basis
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attempted, with some success, to live up to this responsibility with
the adoption and implementation of the Fair Share Criteria.
Soon after their promulgation, the Fair Share Criteria became
the subject of several political and legal battles that tested the city's
attempt to redistribute the benefits and burdens associated with
municipal facilities. The first battle, which was fought in the political
arena, dealt with the city's plan to locate community-based homeless
shelters. The unfortunate result of this battle was that the Fair Share
Criteria were defeated by the "not in my backyard" syndrome, and
failed to make a real difference in locating the shelters.1
7
This political battle illustrates the main problem inherent in
the Fair Share Criteria, which is that they are only administrative
guidelines and not statutes or regulations.18 Therefore, they lack the
full power of legislation, and often amount to mere public relations
procedures that city agencies must follow in order to pacify
communities targeted for the construction of undesirable facilities.
Recent facility siting controversies that have ended up in court further
illustrate the substantive impotence of the Fair Share Criteria. In
adjudicating these controversies, the courts are bound by strict
standards of review,' 9 and can only reverse a city agency's siting
decision if it egregiously deviates from the guidelines contained in the
Fair Share Criteria.20
Decisions from courts adjudicating controversies involving
for imposing further disadvantages.
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390, 415
(N.J. 1983).
,7 See infra pp. 216-21.
IS The Fair Share Criteria note that they are not governed by the City Administrative
Procedure Act, and are intended to merely guide city agencies in fairly distributing
facilities. Fair Share Criteria preface n. 1.
19 See Community Planning Bd. No. 4'v. Homes for the Homeless, 600 N.Y.S.2d
619, 623 (Sup. Ct. 1993) ("The Fair Share Criteria are not regulations which dictate
procedures for agencies .... Some deviation from the Criteria guidelines, therefore,
is anticipated and implicitly allowed.").
" As of this writing, only two courts have invalidated city agency siting decisions
because of egregious failures to comply with the procedure mandated by the Criteria.
See Matter of 45th Street Block Ass'n (Guiliani), No. 118769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30,
1994), reprinted in N.Y. L.J., Dec. 13, 1994, at 26; Silver v. Dinkins, 601 N.Y.S.2d
366 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd., 602 N.Y.S.2d 540 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), appeal denied, 624
N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1993).
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siting and other discretionary guidelines similar to New York City's
Fair Share Criteria also illustrate this limited scope of judicial review
and the substantive ineffectiveness of agency guidelines in general.
Courts are not permitted to substitute their own decisions on where
a facility should be located for those of a duly appointed government
agency, even if these decisions are inequitable, as long as the agency
has followed the basic procedures mandated by the siting guidelines.
As in the decisions involving New York City's Fair Share Criteria,
these decisions expose the inherent problems associated with siting
guidelines: They lack the force of legislation, shift the enforcement
of policy determinations from courts to agencies-who are often more
concerned with cost-effectiveness than with equity-and become, in
effect, mere public relations devices rather than substantive methods
of redistributing the benefits and burdens associated with municipal
facilities.2
This Note examines how lawmakers in New York City have
attempted to redistribute the benefits and burdens associated with
municipal facilities through the implementation of the Fair Share
Criteria, and how this attempt has been interpreted and enforced by
the courts. Part I examines the inequitable overconcentration of
burdensome facilities in poor and minority-populated communities,
and provides some possible reasons for this condition. Part II
explains and evaluates the Fair Share Criteria. Part III examines the
political and legal battles that have erupted over the Criteria in order
to show that, although they are a ground-breaking attempt at
implementing a system of equitable distribution of municipal
facilities, they often amount to a mere procedural process, rather than
a substantive mandate to fairly distribute burdensome municipal
facilities. Part IV examines decisions dealing with siting and other
discretionary guidelines similar to the Fair Share Criteria. This
examination demonstrates that courts enforcing and interpreting these
guidelines run into the same dilemma that courts have with the
Criteria, which is that agencies must be accorded broad deference
when they decide where a facility should be located.
Finally, Part V concludes that if a true equitable distribution
of municipal facilities is to be achieved, clearer expressions of
legislative intent to do so are needed. The pending Federal
21 See infra pp. 236-39.
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Environmental Equal Rights Act22 is examined in order to illustrate
how such legislative intent can be expressed. Until such legislation
is enacted, the courts must enforce not just the procedures mandated
by such measures as the Fair Share Criteria, but also the goals and
aspirations expressed in them in order to bring about an equitable
distribution of the benefits and burdens associated with municipal
facilities.
L Where We Put Our Burdensome Facilities
While most neighborhoods perceive themselves as being
overburdened with undesirable facilities,23 numerous studies have
shown that poor, minority-populated neighborhoods are the ones
actually burdened with landfills, prisons, homeless shelters,
hazardous waste dumps and other undesirable facilities.' In New
I H.R. 1924, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
23 This perception is illustrated by a letter received by Mayor David Dinkins from
a community organization, which stated, in part, that:
The housing policy developed under the previous administration, and
still in force, has resulted in the oversaturation of a non-working
population and the placement of undesirable state and city institutions
throughout the area and in our landmark historic districts. We were
participating in the redevelopment of our community when this
unfair policy was aggressively implemented. .. . We believe that
we had the same rights as residents in other communities throughout
the city to determine the direction of development in our
neighborhoods.
Valletta, supra note 4, at 2 n.5 (quoting a letter, dated Aug. 9, 1990, to Mayor Dinkins
from Harlem People Resisting Injustice, Destabilization, and Exploitation).
24 The following arc Congressional findings of fact:
1) A 1987 study by the United Church of Christ found that the
proportion of minorities in communities with large commercial
landfills or a high number of commercial waste facilities was 3 times
greater than in communities without such facilities.
2) The same United Church of Christ study found that approximately
60% of African- and Hispanic-Americans live in a community that
has an uncontrolled hazardous waste site.
3) An Environmental Protection Agency report released in 1992
found that racial minority and low-income populations experience
higher than average exposures to selected air pollutants and
hazardous waste facilities.
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York City, according to recent census data, most homeless shelters,
incinerators, sewage treatment plants, and other undesirable facilities
are located in poor, minority-populated neighborhoods, such as
Harlem and the Lower East Side of Manhattan. 5  By contrast,
virtually no undesirable facilities are located in white, middle- or
upper-class neighborhoods, such as the Upper East Side of Manhattan
or the borough of Queens.26 According to some commentators, the
overconcentration of oppressive facilities and social services programs
in poor, minority-populated neighborhoods runs the risk of creating
"new ghettos" that will become the dumping grounds for the
undesirable facilities that the more affluent strata of society does not
want located in its backyard.27
No one is certain why burdensome facilities are concentrated
in poor, minority-populated neighborhoods. One reason advanced by
some commentators is that when oppressive facilities are sited in
4) A 1983 analysis by the General Accounting Office found that, in
the southeastern United States, 3 of the 4 commercial hazardous
waste landfills were located in communities with more blacks than
whites, and the percentage of residents near the sites with incomes
below the poverty line ranged from 26% to 42%.
5) A University of Michigan study released in 1990 found that
minorities were 4 times more likely than whites to live within 1 mile
of a commercial hazardous waste facility in the 3-county Detroit
metropolitan area.
6) A National Law Journal study found that penalties imposed for
pollution law violations in areas predominately populated by
minorities were dramatically lower than those imposed for violations
in largely white areas.
H.R. 1924, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993); see Been, supra note 4, at 1009-15
(discussing data which shows that poor, minority-populated communities are burdened
with undesirable facilities); Chambers & Senzel, supra note 14, at S27.
' See Sam Roberts, In My Backyard? Where New York City Puts its Problems, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 6, 1992, § 1, at 54.
See id.
2 See Camilo Jose Vergara, The New Ghettos, CHRIsTIAN Sm. MONITOR, Feb. 14,
1991, at 19. Vergara describes how the dumping of undesirable facilities in the
Brownsville section of Brooklyn and the Mott Haven section of the Bronx transformed
these communities into slums: "The dense concentration of facilities has obvious
consequences. For example, in Mott Haven, so far the most developed of the new
ghettos, three large shelters brought nearly 300 young, single women to an area within
a three-block radius of Jackson Avenue, instantly creating a busy prostitution district."
Id.
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particular communities, these once flourishing neighborhoods are
transformed into slums.2" The proponents of this view claim that
residents who can afford to move away from oppressive facilities do
so, local real estate prices drop, and the poor move in.
29
Those who are intimately involved in urban planning point to
other similar, unintentional reasons for the overconcentration of
undesirable facilities in poor, minority-populated neighborhoods." °
Urban planners claim that poor neighborhoods need more social
services, such as drug rehabilitation clinics and homeless shelters;
therefore, practicality and efficiency dictate that municipal services
should be located where they are needed the most."1 Additionally,
urban planners note that most municipally-owned property is located
in poor urban areas.32 Given this reality, simple economics and thrift
dictate that municipally-sponsored projects should be located
primarily on municipally-owned property.33 For example, New York
City owns only one percent of the property located on the Upper East
Side of Manhattan, while it owns thirty-five percent of the property
I See Been, supra note 4, at 1014 (explaining how market factors and social
mobility often play a part in the overconcentration of undesirable facilities in particular
communities).
29 See id. at 1018; see also Chambers & Senzel, supra note 14, at S27 ("Many who
question the existence of environmental racism argue that the inequitable siting of
hazardous waste facilities-and, hence, the perception of lower environmental quality-in
minority communities may have more to do with market forces than it does with race.").
I See Susan Chira, Programs to Ease Social Problems Burden New York's Poorest
Areas, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1989, at Al (discussing professional urban planners' views
on the siting of municipal facilities).
" See id. at 25 (quoting Sylvia Deutsch of the New York City Planning Commission:
"I believe if there is concentration (of undesirable facilities in poor neighborhoods], it
derives from using opportunities as you find them and putting facilities where the need
is.').
32 See Eve Heyn, Making NYC a Good Neighbor; City Reviews Draft Rules for Siting
Facilities Fairly, NEWSDAY, Nov. 14, 1990, at 23 (discussing the city's ownership of
large amounts of real property in poor neighborhoods); see also Valletta, supra note 4,
at 2 ("During the economic downturn in the mid-1970s, the city became the reluctant
owner of tens of thousands of abandoned residential and commercial properties, most of
which were concentrated in the poorest neighborhoods.").
11 See Chita, supra note 30, at 25 ("[Oifficials [faced with urgent needs to site
facilities) say they can move fastest and least expensively by turning to poor
neighborhoods that have most of New York City's abandoned buildings and vacant
land.").
1994] FAIR SHARE CRITERIA 201
in Harlem.34 The cost-effectiveness of locating facilities where the
city already owns property is shown by the fact that two prisons,
thirty-one drug rehabilitation clinics, and fifty-eight homeless shelters
are located in Harlem, while hardly any undesirable facilities are
located on the Upper East Side."
Another reason advanced by commentators for the
overconcentration of undesirable facilities in poor, minority-populated
neighborhoods is that this condition is the result of intentional
discrimination, racism, and the official trampling of the rights of the
politically powerless.36 In moments of candor, urban planners
support this contention by admitting that undesirable facilities are
sited in poor, minority-populated neighborhoods because the poor and
disenfranchised lack the education, resources and political unity to
mount political attacks against siting decisions. 7 Whether the reasons
34 See Heyn, supra note 32, at 23.
3s See id. Additionally, the overconcentration of burdensome facilities in poor,
minority-populated communities is often the result of unrealistic and antiquated zoning
laws. See Nancy E. Anderson, The Visible Spectrum, 21 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 723, 731
(1994) ("Even if the construction of new sewage treatment plants [in New York City]
was possible, available sites are limited and the political feasibility of the City
government building or expanding sewage treatment outside designated zones ('M'
zones) is nil.").
3 See Chira, supra note 30, at Al ("People in poorer areas cite the concentration
of [undesirable facilities] as evidence of both their political powerlessness and what they
see as a conspiracy to drive out established residents so that their depressed
neighborhoods can be gentrified."). Attempts to challenge siting decisions based on
violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 14th Amendment have
not been successful, because of the need to prove intentional discrimination on the part
of land-useplanners. See, e.g., R.I.S.E. v. Kay, No. 91-2144, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
26732 (4th Cir. 1992); Twiggs v. Macon, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989). For a
discussion of various constitutional and Federal Civil Rights Act theories for challenging
siting decisions, see Naikang Tsao, Ameliorating Environmental Racism: A Citizens'
Guide to Combatting the Discriminatory Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 366, 378-86 (1992).
3" The following advice was contained in a consultant's report concerning the siting
of three proposed waste incinerators in Los Angeles:
Certain types of people are likely to participate in politics, either by
virtue of their issue awareness or their financial resources, or both.
Members of middle or higher-socioeconomic strata (a composite
index of level of education, occupational prestige, and income) are
most likely to organize into effective groups to express their political
interests and views. All socioeconomic groupings tend to resent the
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for the overconcentration of undesirable facilities in poor, minority-
populated neighborhoods is intentional or unintentional-the result of
benign pragmatism or malevolent discrimination-New York City has
attempted to correct this inequitable condition with the adoption and
implementation of the Fair Share Criteria.
I. New York City's Fair Share Criteria
The Fair Share Criteria are the direct result of New York
City's attempt to make city government, in general, and land-use
decision making, in particular, fairer, and more open to public
involvement. Prior to the adoption of the new city charter in 1989,
which mandated the creation of the Criteria, the Board of Estimate
had the final and unquestionable say on all land-use decisions." The
problem with this arrangement was that each Board member had an
equal vote, regardless of the population of the borough he or she
represented.39 The residents of highly populated boroughs, such as
Brooklyn, began to complain that they were under-represented on the
Board, and were shouldering an unequal burden of undesirable
facilities as a result.
40
In 1989, after hearing a challenge brought by the under-
nearby siting of major facilities, but the middle and upper-
socioeconomic strata possess better resources to effectuate their
opposition. Middle and higher-socioeconomic strata neighborhoods
should not fall at least within one mile and five mile radii of the
proposed site.
Been, supra note 4, at 1002 n.6 (quoting J. Stephen Powell, CerrelU Associates,
POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FACING WASTE TO ENERGY CONVERSION PLANT SITING,
REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA WASTE MANAGEMENT BOARD 42-43 (1984)).
's See New York Building Placement Plan Wins Effectiveness Kudos, PUBLIC
FINANCEWASHINGTON WATCH, Aug. 31, 1992, at 2, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File (explaining New York City's land-use decision making process
prior to the adoption of the new city charter). The Board of Estimate was composed of
the mayor, the city counsel president, and each of the five borough presidents. See id.
'9 See id.
I See id. At the time, Brooklyn had a population of over 2,000,000 voters. See id.
Opponents of the existing land-use approval system claimed that it caused "more
facilities designed for the mentally ill, the homeless, and people suffering from the AIDS
virus [to end up] in poor neighborhoods which lacked the clout to keep them out. In the
meantime, wealthier sections of the boroughs escaped these municipal burdens." Id.
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represented residents of the city's less affluent boroughs, the Supreme
Court held that the Board of Estimate was unconstitutional.41
Following this decision, a new charter was drafted, which was
intended to bring a greater degree of fairness and public participation
to all phases of city government.42  To address the issue of
inequitable facility siting, the new charter called for the creation of
the Fair Share Criteria to supplement the existing land-use approval
system. 43 Although it was somewhat closed to public involvement
and review, the city's existing land-use approval system was not
totally dictatorial, and had some mechanisms for public participation
in land-use decisions.' The new city charter, therefore, retained the
old Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP) and budgeting
process, but enhanced them with the Fair Share Criteria mandate. 45
This enhancement was a direct result of the new city charter drafters'
finding that, although the ULURP and budgeting processes provided
numerous opportunities for public participation,46 the process of
"I Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989) (holding that the Board's
decisionmaking process violated the "one person, one vote" principle). The Board of
Estimate, which was New York City's principle governing body, fell after nearly 90
years of existence. See Edward N. Costikyan & Lesze U. Cornfeld, New York City's
New Charter: Land Use Regulations, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 1990, at 1.
42 The new city charter was adopted by a popular vote on November 7, 1989. See
Valletta, supra note 4, at 1 n.3.
43 NEw YORK CrrY CHARTER § 203.
" Under the old city charter, an agency proposing the construction of a facility had
to only follow the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP). See Valletta, supra
note 4, at 3. Under ULURP, an agency suggests an initial site for a proposed facility.
NEw YORK CITY CHARTER § 197-c. The proposal is then reviewed by local community
boards affected by the proposal, the president and board of the borough where the
facility is tentatively slated to be located, the City Planning Commission, and, in some
circumstances, the city council. Id.; see Valletta, supra note 4, at 3. Public hearings
are held at each stage of this process. NEw YORK CrTY CHARTER § 197-c. After
ULURP is complete, a final decision on the location of a proposed facility results after,
in most cases, a vote by the City Planning Commission. See Costikyan & Cornfeld,
supra note 41, at 3. After ULURP approval is complete, the budget for the new project
goes through another review and approval process, which also requires a series of public
hearings. See Valletta, supra note 4, at 4. In addition, the mayor must conduct public
hearings on the "business terms" of any lease or property transaction necessary for the
construction of a facility. NEw YORK CrrY CHARTER § 1602(3)(a).
41 See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER §§ 197-c, 203, 241, 245 & 247.
4See supra note 44.
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choosing a site for a new facility out of a pool of possible alternatives
was inadequately planned, and not fully open to public participation
and scrutiny. 47 The charter drafters concluded that this closed system
was the primary cause of the overconcentration of burdensome
facilities in the city's poor and minority-populated neighborhoods and
the intense opposition to siting decisions made by city agencies. 48 To
open up, guide, and increase the fairness of the site selection process,
the new charter mandated the creation of criteria49 designed "to
further the fair distribution among communities of the burdens and
benefits associated with city facilities, consistent with community
needs for services and efficient delivery of services and with due
regard for the social and economic impacts of such facilities upon the
areas surrounding the site. "'0
Along with the mandate for the creation of the Fair Share
Criteria, the new city charter also required the city to give
communities an early warning when city agencies would be looking
for new facility sites.51 To comply with the site selection notice
requirement of the new charter, the mayor must issue an annual
"statement of needs" concerning all new facility proposals, and
significant expansions or reductions in existing facilities, projected for
the next two years.5 2 An expanded public approval program is then
4' See Valletta, supra note 4, at 5.
See id. at 2. According to Valletta, the Criteria, which were intended to "redress
this disparity of burdens among the city's neighborhoods," are based on "the premise
that citizens are willing to accept a reasonable number of facilities necessary for the
welfare of all, so long as they have assurance that others are sharing an equal burden,
and that they have an equal opportunity to receive a reasonable number of beneficial
facilities." Id.
"' Specifically, the charter called for the mayor, after consulting with all the borough
presidents, to file with the City Planning Commission rules setting out criteria for: "(1)
the location of new city facilities and (2) the significant expansion, closing or significant
reduction in size or capacity for service delivery of existing facilities." NEw YoRK CrrY
CHARTER § 203.
SId.
5' See NEW YORK CITY CHARTER § 204. This early warning requirement was a
response to the general lack of involvement that borough and community leaders had in
site selection under the old charter. See Valletta, supra note 4, at 4-5.
S2 NEw YoRK CrrY CHARTER § 204. The statement is to contain information about
the facility, including the public purpose to be served by it, its size and nature, its
proposed location, and the specific criteria used in choosing the proposed location. Id.
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instituted after the statement, and a map of all city and non-city
owned facilities, along with budget information, is submitted to
borough presidents and borough and community boards. 53  The
statement of needs is intended to communicate city agency decisions
on proposed facility sites to local communities, and to allow
communities to have an informed say in where facilities should be
located.' The agency proposing the inclusion of a site in the city's
long-range plans must do more than just list the proposed site in the
statement; the agency is required also to justify that its site proposal
conforms with the Fair Share Criteria.55 The new city charter,
therefore, sought to have both the Criteria and the statement of needs
aid in correcting both the perception and reality of an inequitable
distribution of facilities that resulted under the auspices of the old city
charter.
A. Development of the Fair Share Criteria
After the mayor submitted the draft Fair Share Criteria to the
City Planning Commission, numerous public hearings concerning
The statement is to be accompanied by a map showing all city and, to the extent
possible, noncity owned facilities in the borough or community in which the facility is
proposed for siting. Id. Budget information for the new facility is also to be released
at the same time as the statement and map. See Valletta, supra note 4, at 6.
53 NEw YORK CITY CHARTER § 204(0. Borough presidents and borough and
community boards must review this information, and hold public hearings on it. Id.
Each borough president has the opportunity to suggest alternative sites in his or her
borough for the proposed facility. Id. If the agency proposing the facility does not
receive a site suggestion from the borough president, it can choose a specific site,
compile all necessary information, and start the ULURP process. See Valletta, supra
note 4, at 6-7. If a site is proposed by the borough president, the agency still may
continue planning for the site it originally proposed. Id. But when the agency's
proposal comes before the City Planning Commission, the proposal must be approved
by a super-majority of the commissioners instead of a simple majority-all that is
necessary when no alternative site is proposed by the borough president. Id. An agency
may still propose a site for a new facility if it is not contained in the statement of needs,
but the borough president affected by the proposal must be given 30 days to review it,
and select an alternative site. Id.
4 See Valletta, supra note 4, at 8.
5 Nw YoRK CITY CHARTER § 204(g).
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them were conducted.56 During the course of these hearings, all of
the city's communities claimed that they were already oversaturated
with burdensome facilities.5 7 In order to prevent the Fair Share
Criteria from becoming a tool of unjustified neighborhood resistance
to a needed facility, the Criteria were designed not to be absolute
prohibitions against the placement of any type of facility in a given
neighborhood.5" If a particular neighborhood already has a high
concentration of facilities, the Criteria dictate that the agency should
consider other alternative sites, but if no other "feasible or cost-
effective" '59 alternatives can be found, the agency is not prohibited
from placing the facility in the neighborhood, even if residents
vehemently oppose it.
61
The City Planning Commission was also confronted with the
problem of how to characterize facilities as either "burdensome or
beneficial" in order to ensure an adequate division of burdens and
benefits throughout the city. 6 The Commission rejected labelling
facilities as either burdensome or beneficial. 62  The Fair Share
See Valletta, supra note 4, at 8.
S ee id.
s See id. at 8-9. Valletta notes that:
[lit became clear in the hearings conducted by the City Planning
Commission that virtually all the neighborhoods represented
perceived themselves to be 'over-saturated' and looked upon fair
share as the means of protection from any unwanted activity ....
[The Criteria], therefore, stress that the nature of the process is a
balance of considerations.
Id.
s9 id. at 9. The prominence of cost-effectiveness is a major criticism of the Fair
Share Criteria, and often causes them to become mere public relations devices, instead
of substantive methods of redistributing the benefits and burdens associated with
municipal facilities. See infra pp. 214-15, 229.
60 See Fair Share Criteria preface & art. 2(a); Valletta, supra note 4, at 9.
"1 See Valletta, supra note 4, at 10.
62 The New York City Bar Association proposed a system of giving numerical scores
to particular facilities in order to calculate their desirability or undesirability. See
Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, "Fair Share" Siting of City Facilities, N.Y.
L.J., June 21, 1990, at 3. For example, a police station would be given an arbitrary
plus 10 desirability score, while a homeless shelter would be given a minus 5
undesirability score. Id. By adding up a neighborhood's total desirability/undesirability
scores, realistic comparisons of neighborhoods' burdens and benefits could be made.
Id. This approach was rejected by the Commission. See Valletta, supra note 4, at 9.
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Criteria were developed with the recognition that all facilities have
both of these characteristics.63 A facility, for example, may be
beneficial to a community if it provides needed services, like fire
protection, while at the same time being burdensome if it increases
traffic congestion or creates other nuisances." Recognizing the dual
nature of most facilities, the Criteria seek to minimize the burdens
associated with facilities-instead of rigidly classifying them-by
promoting proper facility design, sound planning, community
participation in planning decisions, consensus building, and
community monitoring of facilities.6"
After the hearing process was complete, the Criteria became
effective on July 1, 1991." As will be illustrated in the following
section, the Fair Share Criteria, in order to fairly distribute city
facilities, combine the approach of compiling information on a
proposed facility's impact on a particular neighborhood6 7 with the
equitable approach of seeking to avoid undue concentrations of
facilities in communities already overburdened with them.6 8
However, in reality, the Criteria foster information-gathering and
public relations to the detriment of the intended goal of preventing
burdensome facilities from being haphazardly dumped in poor and
minority-populated neighborhood. Because of the prominence of
cost-effectiveness in their siting considerations,69 and their lack of
legislative power,70 the Criteria emphasize impact analysis and mere
public relations over true equitable distribution of facilities.
6 See Valletta, supra note 4, at 9-10.
64 Id.
6 See id.
ISee id. at 1. The Criteria were previously adopted by the City Planning
Commission on December 3, 1990. See Fair Share Criteria preface.
See Kass & Gerrard, supra note 62, at 6 (noting that this "impact assessment"
approach is the key feature of many environmental quality regulations).
"Id. at 7.
See infra pp. 214-15, 229 (discussing how the emphasis on cost-effectiveness often
makes the Criteria an ineffective method of equitably distributing undesirable facilities).
70 See infra pp. 236-39 (discussing how agency guidelines are, in actuality, public
relations procedures, and not substantive mandates for change).
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B. Requirements of the Fair Share Criteria
The stated purpose of the Criteria is to achieve "community
stability and revitalization" through a broad and equitable distribution
of city facilities.7 To this end, the Criteria seek to balance a
community's need for services against a new facility's impact on the
community chosen for a facility's site, and, in addition, to fairly
distribute burdensome facilities throughout the city's various
communities.72 Several of the Criteria's main goals are to stimulate
community participation in city facility73 siting decisions, and to avoid
71 Fair Share Criteria preface.
n The following are the Criteria's stated goals:
a) Site facilities equitably by balancing the considerations of
community needs for services, efficient and cost-effective service
delivery and the social, economic and environmental impacts of city
facilities upon surrounding areas;
b) Base siting and service allocation proposals on the city's long-
range policies and strategies, sound planning, zoning, budgetary
principles and local and citywide land use and service delivery plans;
c) Expand public participation by creating an open and systematic
planning process in which communities are fully informed, early in
the process, of the city's specific criteria for determining the need
for a given facility and its proposed location, the consequences of not
taking the proposed action and the alternatives for satisfying the
identified need;
d) Foster consensus building to avoid undue delay or conflict in
siting facilities providing essential city services;
e) Plan for the fair distribution among communities of facilities
providing local or neighborhood services in accordance with relative
needs among communities for those services;
t) Lessen disparities among communities in the level of responsibility
each bears for facilities serving citywide or regional needs;
g) Preserve the social fabric of the city's diverse neighborhoods by
avoiding undue concentrations of industrial uses in residential areas;
and
h) Promote government accountability by fully considering all
potential negative effects, mitigating them as much as possible and
monitoring neighborhood impacts of facilities once they are built.
Id. art. 2.
7' The Criteria recognize that the siting of state, federal or private facilities does not
fall under the jurisdiction of the city. Id. art. 3 n.2. In certain neighborhoods, these
facilities could contribute to an undue concentration of all types of burdensome facilities.
See id. n.l. The concentration, however, of these noncity facilities in a particular
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siting conflicts by establishing consensus building programs that
foster dialogues between city and community representatives. 74
The Criteria contain basic considerations which must be taken
into account when any type of city facility 75 is to be sited. 76 These
considerations include the compatibility of the proposed facility with
other existing facilities, and the adverse effects of the proposed
facility on the community where it is to be built. 77 The criteria for
the siting of all city facilities also require the agency sponsoring the
project to keep the community informed about its siting decisions by
having agency representatives attend community board meetings, and
by providing site selection notices to community groups.7" As in its
general goals,79 the criteria for the siting of all city facilities
emphasize public participation in siting decisions in order to avoid
neighborhood are to be taken into account when siting a city facility. Id. Also, the City
Planning Commission will use the Criteria when federal or state agencies ask for their
approval of, or recommendation for, a facility site. Id. n.2.
'4 Id. arts. 2(b) & 2(d).
75 A "city facility" is defined as one that is: "(i) operated by the city on property
owned or leased by the city which is greater than 750 square feet in total floor area or
(ii) used primarily for a program or programs operated on behalf of the city which
derives at least 50% and at least $50,000 of its annual funding from the city." id. art.
3(a).
76 The criteria for the siting of all city facilities are as follows:
a) Compatibility of the facility with existing facilities and programs,
both city and non-city, in the immediate vicinity of the site.
b) Extent to which neighborhood character would be adversely
affected by a concentration of city and/or non-city facilities.
c) Suitability of the site to provide cost-effective delivery of the
intended services. Consideration of sites shall include properties not
under city ownership, unless the agency provides a written
explanation of why it is not reasonable to do so in this instance.
d) Consistency with the locational and other specific criteria lor the
facility identified in the Statement of Needs or, if the facility is not
listed in the Statement, in a subsequent submission to a Borough
President.
e) Consistency with any existing [neighborhood or borough] plan
pursuant to Section 197-a of the Charter.
Fair Share Criteria art. 4.1.
n Id.
7 Id. art. 4.2.
9 See id. art. 2.
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costly and time consuming conflicts over proposed facility locations.8"
In its siting considerations for general city facilities, the
Criteria distinguish among facilities that serve individual communities
and those that serve the city as a whole." Little flexibility is possible
in siting a local or neighborhood facility, such as a fire house,
because it must be located directly in a community in order to
properly serve it. 2 On the other hand, a facility that serves the entire
city, such as a hospital, can be located in many different areas of the
city as long as these areas have the necessary space, access to
transportation, and other facility design components." Therefore, an
agency proposing a site for a regional facility must meet a heavier
burden under the Criteria to justify the selection of a particular site
out of a pool of several alternatives.8 4
The criteria for the siting of local facilities only require a
determination of the community's need for the facility and the public
accessibility of the facility at the proposed location." Again, public
8 See id. arts. 4.1 & 4.2.
t The Criteria define a "local or neighborhood" facility as "a city facility serving
an area no larger than a community district or a local service delivery district. . . in
which the majority of persons served by the facility live or work." Fair Share Criteria
art. 3(d). These facilities include branch libraries, community cultural programs, day
care centers, fire stations, police precincts, and senior citizen centers. id. attachment
A. A "regional or citywide" facility is defined as "a facility which serves two or more
community districts or local service delivery districts, an entire borough, or the city as
a whole and which may be located in any of several different areas ...." Id. art. 3(e).
These facilities include administrative offices, courts, airports, sewage treatment plants,
solid waste landfills, hospices, group homes, and prisons. Id. attachment B.
See Valletta, supra note 4, at 13-14.
I id. at 14.
4 Id.
'5 The criteria for the siting of local facilities is as follows:
a) Need for the facility or expansion in the community of local
service delivery district. The sponsoring agency should prepare an
analysis which identifies the conditions or characteristics that indicate
need within a local area (e.g., infant mortality, facility utilization
rates, emergency response time, parkland/population ratios) and
which assesses relative needs among communities for the service
provided by the facility. New or expanded facilities should,
wherever possible, be located in areas with low ratios of service
supply to service demand.
b) Accessibility of the site to those it is intended to serve.
Fair Share Criteria art. 5.1.
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relations are broadly emphasized for the siting of local facilities. In
this regard, the Criteria provide that a community board may
establish a committee to monitor the local facility after its site is
approved.8" After it is established, the committee may report back to
the community board on how the facility is being run, and whether
it is being operated in a fashion that maximizes its benefits, while
minimizing its burdens on the community.8 7
Reflecting the extremely burdensome nature of regional
facilities, the Criteria provide a series of stricter considerations that
apply to the siting of them."8 The criteria for the siting of these types
of facilities require an agency to consider the compatibility of the
proposed site with the facility, and the concentration of other facilities
in the vicinity of the proposed site. 9 The criteria for regional
facilities also require the establishment of a public relations program,
labelled, in this context, as a "consensus building process."" Rather
than making decisions affecting their neighborhoods without giving
them a voice in the site selection process, this consensus building
Id. art. 5.2.
'~Id.
The criteria for the siting of regional facilities are as follows:
a) Need for the facility or expansion. Need shall be established in
a citywide or borough-wide service plan or, as applicable, by
inclusion in the city's ten-year capital strategy, four-year capital
program, or other analyses of service needs.
b) Distribution of similar facilities throughout the city. To promote
the fair geographic distribution of facilities, the sponsoring agency
should examine the distribution among boroughs of existing and
proposed facilities, both city or non-city, that provide similar
services, in addition to the availability of appropriately zoned sites.
c) Size of the facility. To lessen impacts and increase broad
distribution of facilities, the new facility or expansion should not
exceed the minimum size necessary to achieve efficient and cost-
effective delivery of services to meet existing and projected needs.
d) Adequacy of the streets and transit to handle the volume and
frequency of traffic generated by the facility.
Id. art. 6.1.
89 d.
"0 Fair Share Criteria art. 6.2. This consensus building process requires that a
committee made up of affected interests, including community boards, home owners, and
tenant associations, review any disputed issues related to the site selection criteria, and
then negotiate any disputes with the agency proposing the site for a facility. Id.
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program attempts to foster a dialogue with groups that oppose the
selection of a particular regional facility site.9 The criteria for siting
regional facilities also provide for the creation of a post-site selection
monitoring committee similar to the committee provided for in the
criteria for local facility siting.'
The Fair Share Criteria further provide that certain
considerations be taken into account in the siting of specific types of
facilities. The first set of specific considerations relate to the siting
of facilities associated with transportation and waste disposal, such as
airports, ferry terminals, landfills, and incinerators." These criteria
simply attempt to avoid concentrating such facilities within a one-half
mile radius of each other, while at the same time seeking "optimal"
sites for them.' 4 Next, the Criteria provide considerations to be taken
into account when siting facilities that provide temporary or
transitional housing, such as jails and detention centers, and facilities
with large levels of on-site medical or social services.9" The criteria
for siting residential facilities, like the criteria for siting transportation
and waste disposal facilities, seek to avoid concentrating these
9 See Valletta, supra note 4, at 15-16. Agreements reached by the consensus-
building committee are submitted to the City Planning Commission as part of the
ULURP process. Fair Share Criteria art. 6.2.
92 Fair Share Criteria art. 6.3.
9 The criteria for the siting of transportation and waste disposal facilities are as
follows:
a) The proposed site should be optimally located to promote effective
service delivery in that any alternative site actively considered by the
sponsoring agency or identified pursuant to Section 204(0 of the
Charter [i.e.: the borough president's alternative sitel would add
significantly to the cost of constructing or operating the facility or
would significantly impair effective service delivery.
b) In order to avoid aggregate noise, odor, or air quality impacts on
adjacent residential areas, the sponsoring agency and the City
Planning Commission, in its review of the proposal, shall take into
consideration the number and proximity of existing city and non-city
facilities, situated within approximately a one-half mile radius of the
proposed site, which have similar environmental impacts.
Id. arts. 6.41 & 6.42.
94 Id.
1 id. art. 6.51. These criteria do not cover city-owned permanent residences,
apartment buildings or group homes with a family-like character. See Valletta, supra
note 4, at 17.
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particular facilities within a one-half mile radius of each other or, in
other words, to avoid locating residential facilities in communities
with a high "ratio of beds to population."96 The Fair Share Criteria
conclude with requirements for siting administrative offices and data
processing facilities,97 and specific criteria for closing or reducing the
The criteria for siting residential facilities are as follows:
a) Undue concentration or clustering of city and non-city facilities
providing similar services or serving a similar population should be
avoided in residential areas.
b) Necessary support services for the facility and its residents should
be available or provided.
c) In community districts with a high ratio of residential facility beds
to population, the proposed site shall be subject to the following
additional considerations:
i) Whether the facility, in combination with other similar
city and non-city facilities within a defined area
surrounding the site (approximately a half-mile radius,
adjusted for significant physical boundaries), would have
a significant cumulative negative impact on neighborhood
character.
ii) Whether the site is well located for efficient service
delivery.
iii) Whether any alternative sites actively considered by the
sponsoring agency or identified pursuant to Section 204(0
of the Charter [i.e.: the borough president's proposed
alternative site] which are in community districts with
lower ratios of residential facility beds to population than
the citywide average would add significantly to the cost of
construction or operating the facility or would impair
service delivery.
Id. art. 6.5 (footnotes omitted). To aid in the determination of whether a community
district has a high ratio of residential facility beds to population, the Department of
Planning is to publish an annual index of the number of beds in city and noncity facilities
compared to the population, in thousands, of each community district. Id. art. 6.53.
7 The criteria for siting city administrative offices and data processing facilities are
as follows:
a) Suitability of the site to provide cost-effective operations.
b) Suitability of the site for operational efficiency, taking into
consideration its accessibility to staff, the public and/or other sectors
of city government.
c) Consistency with the locational and other specific criteria for the
facility stated in the Statement of Needs.
d) Whether the facility can be located so as to support development
and revitalization of the city's regional business districts without
constraining operational efficiency.
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size or capacity of existing facilities.98
C. Evaluations of the Fair Share Criteria
After their release, the Fair Share Criteria were the subject of
widespread commentary. Some groups praised the Criteria as taking
a bold and ground-breaking step in making land-use decisions based
on principles of equitable geographic distribution of burdensome
facilities." Criticisms of the Fair Share Criteria were also lodged.
Some critics noted that most of the city's burdensome facilities were
already sited; therefore, the Criteria were developed too late in the
city's history to make any real difference in the overconcentration of
undesirable facilities in poor and minority-populated
neighborhoods." ° The main criticism of the Criteria, however, was
Fair Share Criteria art. 7.
" The criteria for the closing of existing facilities, and the significant reduction in
size or capacity of existing facilities are as follows:
a) the extent to which the closing or reduction would create or
significantly increase any existing imbalance among communities of
service levels relative to need. Wherever possible, such actions
should be proposed for areas with high ratios of service supply to
service demand.
b) Consistency with the specific criteria for selecting the facility for
closure or reduction as identified in the Statement of Needs.
Id. art. 8.1. In addition, an agency proposing a facility closing or reduction "shall
consult with the affected Community Board(s) and Borough President about the
alternatives within the district or borough, if any, for achieving the planned reduction
and the measures to be taken to ensure adequate levels of service." Id. art. 8.2.
"' The Criteria were cited by the American Planning Association as a model of fair
urban planning, and were carefully analyzed by other cities trying to solve their own
inequitable siting problems. See New York Building Placement Plan Wins Effectiveness
Kudos, PUBLIC FINANCE/WASHINGTON WATCH, Aug. 31, 1992, at 2, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File.
"o See Vergara, supra note 27, at 19 ("[The Fair Share Criteria] give a false feeling
of relief. They are coming too late to make a real difference, since most of the
controversial facilities are completed or under construction."). Other critics complained
that the decision to allow the City Planning Commission to have the final say on most
siting proposals was not democratic enough, and that such decision-making power should
have been vested in the city council. See Alan Finder, Plan Would Reassign Power on
Land Use, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 20, 1989, at B1, B3. Still other critics complained that the
City Planning Commission was not insulated enough from the political process, was
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the prominence of cost concerns in the siting guidelines.101 If cost-
effectiveness is to be a major, or the primary, concern in facility
siting decisions, then the fact that most city-owned property is located
in poor, minority-populated neighborhoods will dictate that
burdensome city facilities should be located in such neighborhoods. 02
Thus, the inequitable situation that existed before the Fair Share
Criteria were created would persist, and the Criteria would become
a mere sugar-coating on the bitter pill that poor, minority-populated
neighborhoods have to swallow.103
Another major shortcoming of the Fair Share Criteria is that
they are just guidelines intended to aid city agencies in making site
selection decisions. " While the Criteria do set out detailed
considerations to be taken into account when an agency proposes a
site for a facility, they do not force an agency to forgo locating a
burdensome facility in a neighborhood already saturated with such
overly influenced by parochial interests, and not capable of making tough siting
decisions. See id.
'0' See Tsao, supra note 36, at 377. According to this author:
The continued prominence of cost concerns will dilute the effect of
the Fair Share Criteria, and the deep fiscal crisis New York City
faces bolsters this fear. Moreover, because most of the property the
city owns is located in poor areas and because the use of city-owned
property minimizes delay and costs, it is likely that [undesirable
facilities] will continue to be sited in poor areas.
Id.
'o Id. Howard Golden, Brooklyn Borough President, stated: "If the city is truly
committed to the fair share principle, then it must first stop using the reduced cost of
city-owned land as the overriding concern in site selection. This practice has resulted
in the wholesale dumping of unattractive facilities in boroughs and neighborhoods which
are often oversaturated." Heyn, supra note 32, at 23. According to New York Supreme
Court Justice Stephen Crane, an agency's sole reliance on cost-effectiveness would
render the Criteria "illusory," and "would dictate the outcome in the siting of all
facilities." Silver v. Dinkins, 601 N.Y.S.2d 366, 370 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 602 N.Y.S.2d
540 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), appeal denied, 624 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1993).
103 See Tsao, supra note 36, at 377.
104 See Fair Share Criteria preface n. 1 ("These criteria are intended to guide the
siting of city facilities .... [The Criteria are] not governed by the City Administrative
Procedure Act .... ").
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facilities.' Because they are only guidelines, the Criteria lack the
full force of legislation, and, as will be shown in the following
section, they often crumble in the face of political and legal
challenges to siting decisions. Given the true inequity of dumping
burdensome facilities in poor, minority-populated neighborhoods-and
New York City's commitment to correcting this inequity"t°-the Fair
Share Criteria need to be given full force, either by the city's
lawmakers or the courts.1
0 7
IlI. Political and Legal Battles Involving
the Fair Share Criteria
The first test of the Fair Share Criteria arose when New York
City attempted to dismantle its Dantesque homeless shelter system,
and replace it with a system of smaller, community-based shelters. 08
The controversy surrounding the city's homeless population began in
1979, when the city settled a lawsuit that required it to provide
10s See Valletta, supra note 4, at 9. Valletta states:
If one area has a high concentration of facilities of one type, or
overall, the criteria require the sponsoring agency to give a high
level of scrutiny to alternative sites. The agency is not, however,
prohibited from placing the facility in the area if no feasible or cost-
effective alternative is found.
Id.
106 This commitment is unequivocally expressed in the new city charter. NEw YoRK
CITY CHARTER § 203.
"o The Criteria can be given the force of legislation by modeling them after the
pending Environmental Equal Rights Act. See H.R. 1924, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993),
discussed infra pp. 239-42. Until such legislative action is taken, the courts, although
constrained by strict standards of review, can enforce not only the procedures mandated
by the Criteria, but also their goals to equitably redistribute the burdens associated with
municipal facilities. See Silver v. Dinkins, 601 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 602
N.Y.S.2d 540 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), appeal denied, 624 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1993).
06 The plight of the homeless has received much attention since the early 1980s. See
Geoffrey Mort, Establishing a Right to Shelter for the Homeless, 50 BROOK. L. REV.
939 (1984). New York City's homeless population was estimated in the early 1980s to
be 36,000. Id. at 939 n.3.
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shelter to anyone who was without a home."' To avoid anticipated
opposition to the siting of homeless shelters, the Koch administration
surreptitiously converted vacant armories, schools, and hotels into so-
called "temporary shelters,'" which were, in actuality, warehouses for
the homeless." Because of their massive size, inadequate funding,
and lack of supervision, these shelters soon turned into nightmarish,
unsafe dungeons that were unfit for human habitation.1
In 1991, the Dinkins administration, under pressure from
court orders, developed a plan to close the worst of Koch's homeless
warehouses, and to open twenty-four smaller, community-based
'09 A New York City trial court granted a temporary injunction that required the city
to furnish shelter to all those in need. See Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Dec. 5, 1979), reprinted in PRACrISINO LAW INSTrrUTE, THE RIoHTs OF THE
HOMELESS, 221 (1988). In doing so, the court recognized a right to shelter under the
New York State Constitution. See id. In August, 1981, the city entered into a consent
decree that required it to provide the homeless "[with] the bare necessities of shelter: a
mattress, a pillow, clean sheets, soap, a roof over [their] head[sJ." Celia W. Dugger,
A Roof for All, Made of Rulings and Red Tape, N.Y. TIMEs, July 4, 1993, at Bi.
"Koch regards his approval of the decree as one of his biggest mistakes. He handed
[homeless] advocates a club they used to beat up on the city in court and in the press .
11. I d.
"o See Dugger, supra note 109, at BI. "The city faces one constant practical
problem: no one wants a shelter in their neighborhood. The Koch Administration got
around this by turning armories into shelters in the dead of night, busing in as many as
1,000 men to sleep on one vast drill floor." Id.
.. The following is the plight of one family that was placed in an emergency shelter
in Brooklyn:
Their accommodations at the Granada Hotel were insect and rodent-
infested. The Moses children aged two to twelve, share three twin
beds with soiled mattresses and inadequate linen. During their six-
month occupancy of the Granada, there have been approximately six
fires and five alarms have failed to ring although they ring on other
occasions. Two of the Moses children reported having been
threatened with a knife. Mr. Moses has witnessed muggings
perpetrated with both guns and knives. Heat and hot water were so
infrequent that their children were forced to sleep fully clothed on
many nights and contracted colds. Indeed, their two-year old
daughter was hospitalized for pneumonia.
Christine R. Ladd, A Right to Shelter for the Homeless in New York State, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 272, 283 n.81 (1986). Mayor Koch firmly believed that the homeless were
entitled to only minimal quarters, "not better quarters than the working poor trying to
make it without government aid." Dugger, supra note 109, at B2.
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shelters. " 2 The Dinkins administration then faced the same problem
that confronted the Koch administration: where to locate these
shelters in the face of anticipated community opposition.' Unlike
the Koch administration, however, the Dinkins administration had to
work within the guidelines for equitable distribution of city facilities
mandated by the newly adopted Fair Share Criteria."
4
Applying the Fair Share Criteria, the Dinkins administration
proposed locating most of the new shelters in white, middle-class
neighborhoods, primarily in Staten Island and Queens, because the
city's poor, black and Hispanic neighborhoods already had more than
their fair share of city facilities."' As part of the consensus building
program suggested by the Fair Share Criteria," 6 the administration
hoped to blunt opposition to these shelters by gradually releasing their
proposed locations to community boards and borough presidents.
1 7
A local Staten Island newspaper, however, obtained and published a
list of proposed shelter locations before the administration could
112 The Dinkins administration planned to spend $258,000,000 to build 24 small
specialized shelters, offering drug treatment, job training and mental health care under
pressure from the judiciary, particularly Justice Helen Freedman, to reform the homeless
shelter system. See Celia W. Dugger, Setbacks and Surprises Temper a Mayor's Hopes
to House All, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1993, at 1, 24. New York City and the courts have
been waging a running battle over the sheltering of the homeless. For example, Justice
Freedman fined the city and ordered several city officials to spend a night at an
Emergency Assistance Unit (EAU) for failing to comply with a prior order that required
the EAU to be shut down. See McCain v. Dinkins, No. 49182, 1993 N.Y. App. Div.
LEXIS 7599 (App. Div. 1st Dep't July 29, 1993) (upholding only Justice Freedman's
fine). Justice Freedman has also threatened to jail city officials for similar contempt
charges. See Ian Fisher, New York City Fined Again on Homeless, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
5, 1993, at B3.
"' See Dugger, supra note 112, at 24.
1" The Fair Share Criteria became effective on July 1, 1991. See Valletta, supra
note 4, at 1.
15 "The administration generated a long list of possible shelter locations, then
winnowed them down with visits, in the first test of a new city charter requirement that
unwanted facilities be fairly distributed." Dugger, supra note 112, at 24.
"I6 See Fair Share Criteria art. 6.2 ("Where practicable the Mayor may initiate and
sponsor a consensus building process to determine the location of a proposed regional
facility.").
117 See Dugger, supra note 112, at 24.
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trickle out its siting proposals."'
A firestorm of local opposition to the shelter plan followed the
publication of the list. '1 9 Some residents of the predominately white
neighborhoods that were slated for new shelters accused the Dinkins
administration of reverse discrimination. 20 Others, fearing that their
sedate, middle-class way of life would be destroyed by a large influx
of drug-crazed, homeless minorities into their communities,
threatened to use any means necessary, including violence, to prevent
the shelters from opening." This local neighborhood opposition was
channelled into political pressure on the administration, which finally
abandoned its homeless shelter plan. 22  Both the Dinkins
administration and the Fair Share Criteria suffered a major blow. 123
In response to this defeat, the Dinkins administration
appointed a special "blue ribbon" committee to study the homeless
shelter problem. 24 The committee advised the city to get out of the
shelter business, and to instead have the shelter system run by
,,s The administration's plans came apart when Judy Randall, a reporter for the
Staten Island Advance, received a city document marked "confidential" that listed 19
possible shelter locations on Staten Island. See id. Her story ran on page one of the
Advance on August 25, 1991. See id.
119 See id.
120 Some residents of these communities saw the plan "as little more than a black
Mayor's conspiracy" against their white communities. David Gonzalez, Charity Comes
Too Close to Home, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1991, at B1. One white Staten Island
resident stated: "This is just a racial opinion on Dinkins' side. . . . He's just getting
back at white people." Id. at B2.
12 See id at B2. Commenting on the shelter plan, one Staten Island resident stated,
"It would be totally corrupt . . . . The homeless would only take advantage of the
opportunity and commit crimes." Id. Another vowed that a shelter would not be built
in his backyard: "They put it here, it'll be broken down." Id.
"I2 See Dugger, supra note 112, at 24. "The administration's entire strategy for
homeless individuals collapsed practically overnight, trampled by angry politicians and
residents who thronged to not-in-my-backyard meetings with visions of marauding drug
addicts in their heads." Id. According to First Deputy Mayor Norman Steisel: "This
administration thought we were the white hats ... all of a sudden, we became the black
hats." Id. Anne Teicher, deputy director of the Mayor's Office on Homelessness, stated
that the administration "just got killed" in this controversy. Id.
'2' See id.
124 See id. at 24. The Mayor appointed Andrew Cuomo, son of Governor Cuomo
and the former president of a nonprofit organization that ran apartment-style shelters for
homeless families, to serve as chairman of this committee. See id.
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private, nonprofit organizations."12 This recommendation was made,
in part, to avoid the siting problems encountered by the previous
plan.126 Private organizations that receive up to fifty percent of their
funding from the city are exempt from having to comply with the
Fair Share Criteria.127 By having private organizations own and
operate its homeless shelters, the city could site the shelters wherever
the least amount of resistance was encountered, and could avoid the
anger of politically powerful residents by keeping shelters out of their
backyards.' 28
Ironically, the administration that developed and promulgated
the Fair Share Criteria was advised to make an end run around them
in order to avoid a politically damaging controversy surrounding the
siting of undesirable facilities. If the city charter, however, provided
a stronger statement of legislative intent to redistribute the burdens
associated with undesirable facilities, rather than simply calling for
the creation of the siting guidelines to achieve this end,129 a true
equitable distribution of facilities could be achieved, regardless of the
pressure on politicians to appease voters afflicted with the "not in my
J See id. The committee also recommended that only those with no other housing
options should be sheltered and that only those homeless individuals that tried to help
themselves should be given permanent apartments. See id.
126 See Been, supra note 4, at 1052 n.274 ("[The Cuomo committee] recommended
that the city stop providing homeless shelters altogether, and instead leave the task to
private non-profit agencies, in part because those agencies would have more freedom
than the city in siting their services.").
127 The Criteria only apply to "city facilities," defined as those that are "used
primarily for a program or programs operated pursuant to a written agreement on behalf
of the city which derives at least 50% or at least $50,000 of its annual funding from the
city." Fair Share Criteria art. 3(a).
I See Been, supra note 4, at 1009-15 (discussing how political concerns can often
upset equitable siting schemes). New York City's new mayor, Rudolph Guiliani, is on
record as being skeptical of the Fair Share Criteria: He stated during an interview that
the Criteria "deteriorates every neighborhood to bring it down to the lowest common
denominator." See David W. Dunlap, Taking City Planning in a New Direction, N.Y.
TiwEs, Apr. 24, 1994, § 10, at 1. As part of the Guiliani administration's "anti-
obstructionist" program, the Criteria are being re-evaluated. See id. According to the
new City Planning Commissioner, Joe Rose, "Fair Share by itself doesn't provide
adequate tools to make siting decisions." See Loubna Freih, Sites for Social Services;
Excluded Zones Being Considered for Agencies, NEWSDAY, May 24, 1994, at B7.
129 NEW YoRK CrrY CHARTER § 203.
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backyard" syndrome.
130
Since their promulgation in 1991, several siting controversies
involving the Fair Share Criteria have wound up in court.131 These
cases, like the political battle over the city's homeless shelter
relocation plan, illustrate that, being merely guidelines and not
statutes or regulations, the Criteria are often ineffective methods of
equitably distributing burdensome facilities. Because they lack the
full force of positive legislation, a court can reverse a city agency's
siting decision only if the Criteria are blatantly disregarded.
The Fair Share Criteria faced its first court battle in West
97th-West 98th Streets Block Association v. Volunteers of America,13
which involved a neighborhood's reluctance to being the site of a
homeless residence.134 This case dealt with a single room occupancy
(SRO) residence, located on the Upper West Side of Manhattan. 35
Using loan money obtained from the city, Volunteers of America
(VOA) purchased and renovated the residence, 136 which, along with
its low-income occupants, was not very popular with its neighbors. 137
130 See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). In this case, the Supreme Court halted
the construction of a multi-million dollar dam after an agency unequivocally determined
that the dam would destroy the habitat of an endangered species, thereby, violating the
Endangered Species Act. Id. at 193-94. Although halting this project was extremely
unpopular, the Supreme Court had no other choice when faced with an explicit
legislative mandate to protect wildlife threatened with extinction. See id.
131 See, e.g, West 97th-West 98th Sts. Block Ass'n v. Volunteers of America, 581
N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1991), aff'd in part, modified in part, 597 N.Y.S.2d 318 (App.
Div. Ist Dep't 1992); Community Planning Bd. No. 4 v. Homes for the Homeless, 600
N.Y.S.2d 619 (Sup. Ct. 1993); Davis v. Dinkins, 585 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1992);
Silver v. Dinkins, 601 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct.), aft'd, 602 N.Y.S.2d 540 (App. Div.
1st Dep't), appeal denied, 624 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y. 1993); Matter of 45th Street Block
Ass'n (Guiliani), No. 118769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 1994), reprinted in N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 13, 1994, at 26.
131 See Fair Share Criteria preface n. 1.
"1 581 N.Y.S.2d 523 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
134 See id. at 524-26.
3 Id. at 524-25. The court noted that the main characteristic of an SRO is that
some or all of the tenants share kitchen and/or bathroom facilities. Id.
" The VOA took advantage of the city's "Single Room Occupancy Development
Loan-Program." Id. at 525.
1' The plaintiff block association claimed that the SRO occupants were an
"intimidating, harassing, drug-dealing, violent force that was virtually uncontrollable,"
and they complained that the occupants "littered, dealt drugs, fought, fired guns,
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During the renovations, the VOA announced that, in addition to the
SRO's former residents, a sizable mentally ill population also would
be housed in the building."'8 The VOA assured the buildings'
neighbors, however, that in all other respects, the original goal of the
project would remain the same: "To turn a building in deplorable
condition into a decent permanent [SRO] for poor people.""3 9
The VOA's assurances did not quell the fears of the local
community, who recalled the SRO's dangerous past, and foresaw the
city's funding of the project as "extremely tenuous."" The SRO's
neighbors, represented by the plaintiff-block associations, filed suit
to enjoin the reopening of the SRO, claiming that the project violated
the city's land-use approval procedures, including the Fair Share
Criteria. 41 Regarding the cause of action pertaining to the Criteria,
the plaintiffs claimed that their neighborhood was oversaturated with
similar facilities, and that the reopening of the SRO would lead to an
undue concentration of projects serving the poor and mentally ill in
their community. 
1 2
After hearing the case, Justice Martin Schoenfeld dismissed
all of the plaintiffs' charges against the VOA, except the cause of
action for the agency's failure to apply the Fair Share Criteria.'43 His
main reason for allowing this cause of action was the involvement of
harassed women, burgled apartments, threatened people with weapons, stole laundry out
of laundry rooms, and made loud noises at all hours." Id.
1 id. at 525.
"39 West 97th, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 525. The VOA stated that "the [building] previously
was, and will still be an SRO and that the total square footage of the [bjuilding will be
the same. Furthermore, approximately 25 former tenants will be returning to the
building .... Many of the [newl residents (are] currently residing on the 'Upper West
Side' albeit some of them may now be sleeping on side walk gratings." Id. The VOA
also promised that the building would be adequately staffed with drug and alcohol abuse
counsellors and security personnel, hired with funds obtained from the city's Human
Resource Administration and Department of Health. Id.
140 Id.
"I' The plaintiffs asserted causes of action for violations of the Fair Share Criteria,
ULURP, the New York State Environmental Quality Review Act, and the City
Environmental Quality Review rules. Id.
142 Id.
' Id. at 526.
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various city agencies in the project.1"4 The judge, however, denied
the plaintiffs motion for an injunction because of the advanced stage
of the SRO renovation, and other outstanding questions concerning
the applicability of the Fair Share Criteria, such as whether the
project was "new" and "public"-in which case the Criteria would
have to be strictly adhered to-or whether the project was merely a
"private renovation" to which the Criteria did not apply. 45
On appeal, the case was dismissed in full, after the appellate
division determined that the Fair Share Criteria were inapplicable. 
1
This court held that the Criteria were not applicable because the
renovations to the SRO did not substantially alter the physical
characteristics of the building, and could be seen as neither the
construction of a new building, nor the significant expansion of an
existing one.1 47  Likewise, the court held that the housing of the
mentally ill in the building bore absolutely no relationship to the
objectives of the Fair Share Criteria. 148 The court also found that the
city's involvement with the facility was minimal, and boiled down to
incidental contracts with a private organization, which were not
covered by the Criteria.149
As in the political battle over the city's homeless shelter plan,
the Fair Share Criteria in this case played no role in determining the
location of an undesirable facility. Again, the often unpopular
principle of equitable burdensome facility siting was circumvented by
a city agency's utilization of a politically expedient "loophole"
'1 West 97th, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 526. Justice Schoenfeld also noted that the project
received partial city funding. Id.
14' Id.
14 West 97th-West 98th Sts. Block Ass'n v. Volunteers of America, 597 N.Y.S.2d
318, 320-21 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1992). The Appellate Division characterized the
action as "no more than a quibble over what proportion of the homeless residents will
be permitted to suffer from severe psychological or physical impairments when, almost
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contained in the Criteria.150 West 97th also illustrates the deference
courts give city agencies locating facilities under the Fair Share
Criteria." The court simply found that the Criteria were not
applicable, which conveniently terminated its inquiry into the
agency's compliance with them. 2
In another challenge to the siting of a homeless residence run
by a private organization, this extreme judicial deference to a city
agency's siting decision under the Fair Share Criteria is again
illustrated. In Community Planning Board No. 4 v. Homes for the
Homeless,' the defendant had purchased a building, formerly used
as a dormitory, with the assistance of a mortgage secured by a city
agency,'m5 renovated the building, and converted it into a residence
for homeless families.' 5 In an attempt to comply with the Fair Share
Criteria, the commissioner of the city's Human Resources
Administration (HRA), the agency that helped Homes for the
Homeless (HFH) secure the mortgage, sent a letter to the mayor and
the plaintiff-community board, notifying them that the building was
50 See id. at 321. This "loophole" is the Criteria's narrow definition of a "city
facility." See Fair Share Criteria art. 3(a). Other courts have also held that an apparent
city facility was, in actuality, not a city facility under this narrow definition. See
Community Planning Bd. No. 4 v. Homes for the Homeless, 600 N.Y.S.2d 619 (Sup.
Ct. 1993) (homeless shelter purchased with a mortgage secured with city assistance);
O'Donovan v. Dinkins, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 29, 1993, at 21 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (homeless
shelter receiving partial city funding); Matter of Marotta (Community Agency for Senior
Citizens, Inc.), N.Y. L.J., May 28, 1992, at 26 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (senior citizens
residence receiving partial city funding).
151 See West 97th, 597 N.Y.S.2d at 321. The Appellate Division seemed to peg the
plaintiffs as bigoted sufferers of the "not in my backyard" syndrome, and did not
seriously consider their claim that the area around the SRO was oversaturated with
similar undesirable facilities. Id.
5Id.
253 600 N.Y.S.2d 619, 623 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
"I Id. The purchase of the building was financed by an $8,500,000 loan made
pursuant to Article XI of the New York State Private Housing Finance Law to Homes
for the Homeless (HFH) by the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and
Development, which was secured by a mortgage on the building. Id.
" I d. The HFH converted the building into a "Tier II" transitional residence for
84 homeless families, primarily unwed mothers with one or two children, and named it
the Midtown Interfaith Family Inn. Id.
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being converted into a homeless shelter.1 56 Claiming that this letter
was not enough to comply with the Fair Share Criteria, the plaintiff
brought suit to enjoin the opening of the homeless residence until the
HRA complied with the city's land-use approval procedure, including
the Criteria. 57
Justice Helen Freedman' held that the city's land-use
approval procedure did not apply to this action, and granted the
defendant's summary judgment motion. 159 In her consideration of the
plaintiffs Fair Share Criteria cause of action, Justice Freedman stated
that the Criteria are merely guidelines for locating facilities, and "not
regulations that dictate procedures. "" While noting that a flagrant
disregard of the Criteria could give rise to a cause of action, 6' she
stated that some deviation from them was "anticipated and implicitly
allowed."' 62 She went on to hold that the city agency involved with
this facility had substantially complied with the Criteria by sending
notice to the mayor and community board of the building's
conversion to a homeless shelter.' 63
Justice Freedman also held that, regardless of the HRA's
substantial compliance with them, the Criteria did not apply to this
action because the homeless residence at issue did not fall within the
Criteria's definition of a city facility." The judge reached this
Im Id. at 620-21. This letter, from HRA Commissioner Barbara J. Sabol, stated
that, "neither the City nor the sponsor was able to consult with the community prior to
concluding a contract for the [premises'] purchase to ensure that the deal could be
negotiated on the most favorable terms possible." Id. at 621.
157 Id. The plaintiff asserted causes of action for violations of the Fair Share
Criteria, ULURP, the New York State Environmental Quality Review Act, and the City
Environmental Quality Review procedure. id.
'm Justice Freedman has a history of being tough on homeless issues. See supra note
112.
159 Community Planning Bd. No.4, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 624.




" Community Planning Bd. No. 4, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 624. Other courts have also
held that privately owned, but city funded, residences did not fall within the Fair Share
Criteria's definition of a city facility. See O'Donovan v. Dinkins, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 29,
1993, at 21 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (refusing to enjoin the opening of a privately owned
homeless shelter because petitioners did not conclusively prove that the shelter was a city
19941 225
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holding by pointing to the fact that the residence was owned and
operated by a private organization, and only received a mortgage, not
funding, from a city agency. 6  As in the West 97th case, the
homeless residence at issue in this action fell into one of the
exceptions to the Fair Share Criteria; therefore, the agency
responsible for siting the residence was exempted from complying
with them."' Furthermore, Justice Freedman implicitly revealed one
of the flaws in the Fair Share Criteria, which is that they are mere
guidelines, and not statutes or regulations. 67 As such, courts must
grant agencies broad discretion in complying with them.
Although they are merely guidelines, the Fair Share Criteria
have been given force by a few courts. In Davis v. Dinkins,168 a case
involving another homeless residence-but one directly under the
control of a city agency-the Fair Share Criteria were found to be
directly applicable. 69 This action involved a hotel that was leased by
a city agency, again the HRA, to house homeless families. 7 °
Claiming that the facility would have an adverse effect on their
community, and would also threaten its health and safety, the
plaintiffs, a group of homeowners living adjacent to the facility,
brought suit to enjoin the opening of the residence until the city
facility under the Criteria); Matter of Marotta (Community Agency for Senior Citizens,
Inc.), N.Y. L.J., May 28, 1992, at 26 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (refusing to enjoin the opening
of a privately owned senior citizens home because petitioners did not prove that the
home was either a city facility or residence under the Criteria).
" In this regard, Justice Freedman noted that:
[The shelter] is operated by the staff of HFH, a private organization,
in property owned by HFH. Moreover, the programs HFH operates
at [the shelter], even if construed to be 'on behalf of the City,' are
not pursuant to any written agreement with the City. Finally, the
monies given to HFH, including a market-rate mortgage loan ... do
not comprise 'funding' in the sense of financial assistance to the
organization.
Community Planning Bd No. 4, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 624.
166 Id.
17 See id. at 623.
10 585 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
'69 Id. at 982.
" The owner of the hotel offered it to the HRA to house 150 homeless families.
Id. at 979. The HRA accepted the offer, and agreed to pay $105 per day to house each
family. Id. at 980. The agency also obtained space in the hotel to provide on-site
services to the occupants. Id.
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conducted ULURP and Fair Share proceedings.171  The city
responded by claiming that the payments to the hotel owner to
provide shelter to the homeless families did not, in actuality,
constitute a lease; therefore, land-use approval proceedings, and an
application of the Fair Share Criteria were not required.
1
After examining the intent of the parties, and concluding that
there was a grant of "exclusive control and possession of specified
space for a specified term" to the city, Justice Herbert Posner held
that a lease was created between the hotel owner and the HRA.
1 73
Because a lease was created, the judge held that the city was required
to undertake its land-use approval procedure, including using the Fair
Share Criteria to determine whether the site was suitable for use as
a homeless residence.174
171 Id. at 981. The homeowners brought suit under Article 78 of New York's Civil
Practice Law and Rules. Id. at 979. Article 78 deals with actions against a "body or
officer" to seek "a writ or order of certiorari, mandamus or prohibition." N.Y. CIrv.
PRAc. L. & R. §§ 7801, 7802 (McKinney 1994). The only questions that can be raised
in an Article 78 proceeding are as follows:
1. whether the body or officer failed to perform a duty enjoined
upon it by law; or
2. whether the body or officer proceeded, is proceeding, or is about
to proceed without or in excess of jurisdiction; or
3. whether a determination was made in violation of lawful
procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and
capricious or an abuse of discretion, including abuse of discretion as
to the measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed; or
4. whether a determination made as a result of a hearing held, and
at which evidence was taken, pursuant to direction by law is, on the
entire record, supported by substantial evidence.
Id. § 7803. A court's standard in reviewing administrative proceedings in an Article 78
action is to determine "whether (the agency's findings] was made in violation of lawful
procedure, was affected by an error of law or was arbitrary and capricious or an abuse
of discretion." Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 494 N.E.2d 429, 435
(N.Y. 1986) (citations omitted).
172 Davis, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 982. The city also claimed that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to bring this suit. Id. The court held that the plaintiffs did have standing to
seek judicial review of the city's conduct. Id.
17 Id.
74 Id. After this decision was handed down, another court held that the Fair Share
Criteria did not apply retroactively to a lease approved by the Board of Estimate under
the old city charter when the lease was amended after the new city charter became
effective. Rowe v. City of New York, 615 N.Y.S.2d 959 (Sup. Ct. 1994). Concerning
the retroactive effect of the Criteria, another court in 1991 held that they did not apply
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After winning the battle, however, the plaintiff-homeowners
lost the war. Justice Posner refused to enjoin the continued operation
of the residence, holding that the plaintiffs "failed to demonstrate that
irreparable harm will arise from the continued use of the [hotel] to
house the homeless.""' He also held that it would be improper to
enjoin the use of the hotel to shelter homeless families because of the
dire need for such facilities in New York City. 76 Therefore, while
the Fair Share Criteria were found to be applicable in this case, they
had no effect on the city's decision to locate an undesirable facility
in the plaintiff-homeowners' neighborhood. Again, the Davis court
implicitly emphasized the discretionary nature of the Fair Share
Criteria.
While the Davis court found the Criteria to be applicable to
the case at bar, the court did not give them any true effect. Silver v.
Dinkins,' however, gave the Fair Share Criteria "teeth,"""8 although
probably false teeth. This case involved a decision by the city's
Departments of Health and Sanitation to convert city owned piers on
the Lower East Side of Manhattan into a garage and fueling
facility.' 79 After the city agencies conducted public hearings on the
project in accordance with ULURP and the Fair Share Criteria, the
site for the facility was approved by the city council. 18
Local community representatives brought suit .to halt
to a facility closure decision made before the Criteria were promulgated. Lower East
Side Joint Planning Council v. Dinkins, No. 40566 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 25, 1991),
reprinted in N.Y. L.J., Oct. 29, 1991, at 22.
175 Davis, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
176 Specifically, Justice Posner held that "the granting of such relief is inappropriate
under the circumstances now existing in New York City. The indisputable compelling
need to provide temporary housing for homeless families clearly makes it an abuse of
discretion to preclude the use of a hotel which is already housing these families." Id.
"7 601 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sup. Ct. 1993).
"7 See Richard Perez-Pena, Court Forces Halt to an Unwanted Public Project, N.Y.
TlM~s, Oct. 16, 1993, at 27 (quoting Gene Russianoff, a lawyer with the New York
Public Interest Research Group: "When the new city charter was passed, a lot of people
thought the fair share provisions had the most revolutionary potential in [them]. The
rulings in [Silver] have put real teeth into [themi.").
7 The proposed sites for these facilities were at Piers 35 and 36, located on the East
River and South Street. Silver, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 368. The piers are city-owned wharf
property which consists of a bulkhead, pier and uplands areas. id.
180 Id.
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construction of the facilities, claiming that the city's Fair Share
analysis was improperly conducted and faulty." First, they claimed
that the city improperly considered only one alternative noncity-
owned site for the facilities, violating the Criteria's requirement that
both city- and noncity-owned sites be considered as alternatives.
18 2
Secondly, the plaintiffs alleged that the city avoided the Criteria's
required determination of the concentration of facilities in the area. 8 3
Finally, the plaintiffs contended that the facilities were incompatible
with, and would have an adverse effect upon, the community as a
whole. I"
After hearing the case, Justice Stephen Crane held that the
city did not properly follow or apply the Fair Share Criteria.8 5
Addressing the plaintiffs' first claim, Justice Crane stated that the
Criteria did not dictate that a minimum number of noncity-owned
sites should be considered as possible site alternatives. 86 But,
although it may be "cost-effective," relying on city-owned properties
as the sole site alternatives is not proper under the Fair Share
Criteria, according to the judge. 8 7 He went on to hold that applying
cost-effectiveness as the primary consideration in facility siting
decisions renders the Criteria "illusory," because the cost savings
associated with locating facilities on city-owned property "would
dictate the outcome in the Siting of all facilities," and the city would
never locate facilities on privately-owned property.
1 88
Addressing the plaintiffs' second claim, Justice Crane held
that the city failed to properly consider the compatibility of the
st Id. This action was brought under Article 78 of New York's Civil Practice Law
and Rules. Id. at 367; see supra note 171 (discussing Article 78 proceedings).
" Silver, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
183 The plaintiffs provided information that showed that 4 jails, 11 drug treatment
centers, and 12 homeless shelters are located in the immediate vicinity of the site. Id.
I The plaintiffs asserted that the facility was "not compatible with and [would]
adversely affect the surrounding neighborhood as a result of the increased noise,
pollution, and traffic." Id. at 369.
185 Id.
'8 Id. at 370.
t8 Silver, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
18 Id. ("Thus, the mere fact that it would involve less time and expense for [the
agencies] to locate [the facility] on Piers 35 and 36 is not sufficient to satisfy the Fair
Share Criteria.").
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facilities with the other city- and noncity-owned facilities in the
area. '9 The judge held that the city's reliance on a historic
coexistence of other similar facilities with the proposed facilities was
not enough to fulfill the Criteria's mandate to avoid siting facilities
that are incompatible with each other and the surrounding
community.t9° To support this holding, he noted that the city never
considered the twelve schools that are within a one-half mile radius
of the proposed facilities' sites, one of which is only one block away
from them. 91
Addressing the plaintiffs' third claim, Justice Crane held that
the city's most "egregious dereliction" of the Fair Share Criteria was
its complete failure to assess the impact of the proposed facilities on
the character and nature of the neighborhood." z The city merely
concluded that because the neighborhood already had a large
concentration of undesirable facilities, it would not be adversely
affected by two more.' 93 According to the judge, the city made no
attempt to determine whether the community was bearing its fair
share of city facilities or whether it was being used as a "de facto
dumping ground" for unwanted projects.'"
While not characterizing the city's determination to locate the
facilities on the Lower East Side as "arbitrary or lacking a rational
basis," Justice Crane held that the city did not properly comply with
the Fair Share Criteria or conduct the meaningful impact analysis that
is required by them.'95 The city merely paid "lip service" to the
Criteria, which, in the judge's opinion, was not enough. 96
'" The City only examined other facilities within a 400 foot radius of the site, and
concluded that a garage and fueling station would be similar to other uses of the site
which have historically coexisted with the surrounding neighborhood. Id. at 369.
11 Id. at 370. ("Moreover, that these types of uses have coexisted in the past does
not warrant the conclusion that the [proposed] facility automatically [is] compatible with
existing programs.").
191 Id.
19 Silver, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
19 Id.
19 Id. at 370-71.
'9 Id. at 371.
9 Id. The Appellate Division affirmed Justice Crane's opinion, Silver v. Dinkins,
602 N.Y.S.2d 540 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1993), and the Court of Appeals refused to
reconsider the Appellate Division's decision, Silver v. Dinkins, 624 N.E.2d 695 (N.Y.
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While the Silver court invalidated city agencies' siting
decisions because of failures to comply with the Fair Share Criteria,
the real impact of this decision is still unknown."9 The agencies
could still come to the same siting decision after conducting the
impact analysis and consensus building program mandated by the
Criteria, and which was enforced by Justice Crane, given the
agencies' desire to quickly and efficiently site the facility.198 As was
plainly stated by Justice Crane, if challenged again, a court would be
able to reverse the new siting decision only if it was "arbitrary or
lacking a factual basis."99 Because of this extreme degree of judicial
deference, siting decisions will continue to be ultimately controlled
by agencies, which are often motivated by concerns other than the
equitable distribution of undesirable facilities.
Although lacking the full force of legislation, which
essentially ties a court's hands when evaluating an agency's
substantive compliance with New York City's equitable siting
requirements, the Fair Share Criteria's community involvement
provisions are being carefully enforced by the judiciary. For
example, in Silver, an agency was not allowed to pay "mere lip
service" to the Criteria." Similarly, in Matter of 45th Street Block
Association,01 the court did not allow city agencies to change the
proposed use and nature of a facility without the full community
involvement program mandated by the Criteria. 2' This case involved
1993).
'97 The garage and refueling station at issue in Silver were originally located beneath
the Willamsburg Bridge. See James Bennet, Victory Claimed for Areas Burdened by City
Projects, N.Y. TIMEs, May 1, 1993, at L27. The city planned to relocate the facilities
at the Lower East Side Piers in order to make space beneath the bridge for
reconstruction work. Id. If the facilities were not moved, work on the bridge could not
proceed, and the city would risk forfeiting up to $300,000,000 in federal assistance for
the renovation project. Id.
' See Fair Share Criteria arts. 6.2 & 6.4.
z Justice Crane explicitly stated that he did not find the city agencies siting decision
to be "arbitrary or lacking a rational basis." Silver, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 371. He only
found that the agencies failed to comply with the procedure required by the Fair Share
Criteria. See id.
20 Id.
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a transitional housing facility for mentally ill women proposed to be
located in mid-town Manhattan.2"3 In accordance with the Fair Share
Criteria, the city agencies responsible for siting the facility opened a
dialogue with community representatives and organizations in the
neighborhood chosen for the facility."20 This dialogue resulted in an
agreement that the facility "would be limited to a 150-bed transitional
housing facility for women 'providing on-site intensive, social
services andior mental health program[s] to its residents, and not as
a general shelter.'"205
Despite this dialogue and resulting agreement, community
organizations went to court to challenge the agencies' site selection
process and compliance with the Fair Share Criteria.2"6 After the
case was heard, this challenge was summarily rejected by Justice
Dianne Lebedeff. 20 7 According to the judge, the city agencies had
consulted and worked with the community throughout the site
selection process for the facility, and the "community had expressed
2 The facility, which was designated "for substance abusing and mentally ill
women," was to be located at 215/225 East 45th Street, and was to be known as the
"Transitional Living Center" and "STAR Therapeutic Center." Id. The facility was a
former Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York office building and nuns' residence,
which the city bought in 1993 for $79,000,000. See Bruce Lambert, Neighborhood
Report: Turtle Bay; Judge Rejects Revised Plan for a Shelter, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
1994, § 3, at 7.
204 45th Street Block Ass'n, slip op. at 2. The Department of General Services and
the Human Resources Administration were responsible for siting the facility. Id. at 1.
"In an effort to comply with the New York City Charter's regulations concerning the
ULURP and Fair Share criteria, the City held a number of meetings with community
representatives and Manhattan Borough President Ruth Messinger." Id. at 2.
213 Id. The agreement quoted above was memorialized in a letter of agreement,
dated April 13, 1993, between Deputy Mayor Caesar A. Perales and Borough President
Messinger. Id. The letter also stated that a Community Advisory Committee (CAC)
would be established in accordance with Article 4.2 of the Fair Share Criteria, and that
the CAC would "receive the full cooperation of the responsible City agencies ... [and]
meetings of the CAC will be well publicized and regularly scheduled." Id.
Matter of Turtle Bay Ass'n (Dinkins), N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 1993, at 21 (Sup. Ct.
Nov. 1993), affid, 616 N.Y.S.2d 31 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 1994).
" Turtle Bay Ass'n, N.Y. L. J., Nov. 19, 1993, at 21. Specifically, the petitioners
in this Article 78 proceeding claimed that the city agencies did not comply with the Fair
Share Criteria because "there is no showing that any other location in any other
community was considered as a specific alternative to this project." Id.
1994] FAIR SHARE CRITERIA 233
a need for mental health services."208 Therefore, she held that there
was "no 'egregious' violation or 'flagrant disregard' of the Fair Share
Criteria. 
29
Following the issuance of this decision, the dialogue between
the city agencies and community representatives abruptly ceased.210
The agencies then released a tentative construction plan, or "Request
for Proposals (RFP)," which stated that "in the event funding is not
available [for the women's mental health care facility] the alcoholism
and substance abuse program will utilize those beds." 21 ' Before the
ink was dry on the RFP, which contained this alarming funding
contingency, local community organizations and representatives were
back in court to challenge the agencies' compliance with the Fair
Share Criteria, and to enjoin the opening of the facility.212 The city
agencies, in response to the community's allegations, argued that they
had substantially complied with the Criteria by involving the
community in siting and design decisions from the very beginning of
the project. 23  Additionally, the agencies claimed that a certain
amount of secrecy in preparing the RFP was necessary and
I d. Judge Lebedeff also noted that "in a community which had expressed a need
for mental health services, the project took on a mental health flavor while still
addressing homeless women." Id.
l9 Id.
210 45th Street Block Ass'n, slip op. at 3.
21 Id. (noting that the draft RFP was released by the city on May 12, 1994, and
"was never presented to the CAC for comment prior to its release").
211 See id. at 1. The petitioners in this Article 78 proceeding included the 45th Street
Block Association, the Pen and Pencil Restaurant (located at 205 East 45th Street), John
Bruno (the owner of the restaurant), and Alan Lawrence. See Gerisse Anderson, "Fair
Share" Violation Halts Renovation, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 12, 1994, at 1, 5; Lambert, supra
note 203, at 7.
213 Specifically, the agencies claimed that:
The CAC completed its initial recommendations at its meeting on
June 14, 1993, focusing their attention [on) the relationship of the
planned facility to the neighborhood so as not to injure the
neighborhood in terms of nuisances, as well as [to] facilitate the
community in achieving its goals for the programs at the facility.
45th Street Block Ass 'n, slip op. at 3. The agencies also claimed that comments on the
Request for Proposals were to be sought from the CAC after it was released. Id. at 4.
234 NYLS JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. XII
inevitable.21 4
Justice Charles Ramos, who heard this second round of Fair
Share Criteria challenges to the location of the facility, found the
agencies' arguments to be unconvincing.215 He stated that the
agencies' secretive policy for developing the RFP, "which suggests
that bureaucratic considerations can justify government behind closed
doors, cannot be condoned." 21 "6 To support this holding, the judge
relied on the prior litigation involving the facility; primarily on the
fact that the inclusion of the women's mental health care program,
which both parties to the prior litigation agreed upon, was the central
element of the Justice Lebedeff's holding that the agencies had
complied with the Criteria. 27 According to Justice Ramos, one of the
primary objectives of the Fair Share Criteria is to "expand public
participation by creating an open and systematic planning process. ,,218
He went on to find that the agencies circumvented and hindered this
objective by unilaterally ceasing meetings with community
representatives, and by not guaranteeing the inclusion of the women's
mental health care program within the facility.219
Concerning this possible switch in facility programs, Justice
Ramos stated that, although the "not in my back yard mentality" is
adopted by many communities in which shelters are to be located, the
2"4 In terms of the delay in releasing the RFP, the agencies contended that this was
the result of delays in its preparation "coupled with the change of municipal
administration, the reorganization of some of the agencies, and a review of the RFP."
Id. The agencies also claimed that secrecy was necessary "to insure fairness in the
bidding process and to prevent potential bidders from learning the RFP requirements in
advance." Id.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 4.
217 Id. at 5 (citing Matter of Turtle Bay Ass'n (Dinkins), N.Y. L.J., Nov. 19, 1993,
at 21 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 1993)). Justice Ramos noted that the "decision in Turtle Bay
centered on the inclusion of the [women's mental health care facility] and the active role
the community played in the decision making process with respect to the facility." Id.
According to the judge, "these are the very same issues the Respondents disregarded in
failing to disclose what would actually be included in the RFP." Id.
2.. 45th Street Block Ass 'n, slip op. at 6 (citing Fair Share Criteria art. 2(c) & (e)).
29 Id. Justice Ramos also found the argument that the opening of the facility should
not be enjoined because of the city's desperate need for shelters to be equally
unconvincing, based again on the agencies' unilateral cessation of community
involvement in changing the nature and purpose of the facility. Id. at 7.
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community in this case "attempted to create a facility which was
specifically suited to the problems facing . .. their backyard, and
were led to believe that such programs would be included in the
facility." 0 Therefore, the judge permanently enjoined the opening
of the facility, holding that the release of the RFP, with the inclusion
of the mental health care program contingent on the availability of
funding, was a "flagrant disregard for the Fair Share Criteria, and
contrary to the concept of a participatory democracy those criteria
were intended to foster. "
221
The decision in 45th Street Block Association can be seen as
another court victory for the proponents of the Fair Share Criteria
and the concepts of "participatory democracy" that they represent. 22
Justice Ramos did prevent city agencies from "pulling a bait and
switch," whereby agencies would gain the community's support for
one type of facility, and then change the nature and intended use of
a facility behind the community's back.223 However, as in Silver, the
court here found that the city agencies failed to comply with the
community participation-or public relations-mandates of the
Criteria, not their substantive requirements. 2' As in cases
interpreting siting guidelines similar to the Fair Share Criteria, which
will be discussed in the following section, courts can do no more than
enforce the procedure called for in the Criteria, but not their
220 Id.
,21 Id. at 8. The agencies were also ordered to "rescind, withdraw and annual" the
RFP. Id.
22 Jack Lester, the attorney for the 45th Street Block Association petitioners, "hailed
the decision as a precedent upholding community rights." Lambert, supra note 203, at
7. However, Sam Szurek, a spokesman for one of the agencies sponsoring the facility,
stated that the city was planning to appeal Justice Ramos' decision because funding for
the women's mental health care program had been secured. Id. Chairman of the CAC,
Perry Luntz, shot back, stating that "there was still no assurance of the mental health
service funds, [a]nd with a new governor and growing city and state budgetary problems,
... the likelihood of getting the money was more dubious than ever." Id.
223 See Scott E. Mollen, Realty Estate Update; Really Law Digest; Residence for
Mentally Ill Blocked-City Failed to Comply with "Fair Share" Rules, N.Y. L.J., Jan.
4, 1995, at 5. "The court recognized that unlike so many other communities, this
community had accepted and supported a shelter program. The court appeared
concerned that the City might have 'pulled a bait and switch,' by initially promising one
program and then seeking authorization for a different program." Id.
224 See 45th Street Block Ass 'n, slip op. at 8.
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substance, without the full force of legislation and political will
behind them.
IV. Decisions Dealing with Siting Guidelines Similar
to the Fair Share Criteria
Courts traditionally afford agencies great deference in
deciding on sites for government facilities.225 In adjudicating cases
dealing with agency decisions under siting and other discretionary
guidelines,226 a court is limited in its scope of review.227 A court
cannot substitute its own judgment for that of an agency, and can
only reverse an agency's decision if it is "arbitrary or lacking a
rational basis." 228 Once a court has determined that an agency has
complied with the guideline's procedure, and has taken a "hard look"
2 As in the Silver court's interpretation of the Fair Share Criteria, an agency's
siting decision can not be reversed unless it is "arbitrary or lacking a rational basis."
Id.
I' The cases discussed in this Part deal with siting and other discretionary agency
mandates embedded in statutes or regulations. In contrast, New York City's Fair Share
Criteria are not statutes or regulations, but are mere guidelines; therefore, an agency
siting a facility under them will be accorded an even greater degree of judicial deference.
See Community Planning Bd. No. 4 v. Homes for the Homeless, 600 N.Y.S.2d 619, 623
(Sup. Ct. 1993) ("The Fair Share Criteria are not regulations that dictate procedures for
agencies; rather, they are criteria which are intended to guide the siting of city
facilities."). For a discussion of state and federal statutory siting and other discretionary
guidelines, and the judiciary's interpretation of them, see James S. Freeman & Rachel
D. Godsil, The Question of Risk. Incorporating Community Perceptions into
Environmental Risk Assessments, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 547 (1994).
2 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). This case
concerned a federal agency's decision to construct a highway through a public park. id.
at 408. In holding that the agency complied with the legislatively imposed mandates to
consider the environmental impacts of the project, including the National Environmental
Policy Act, the Supreme Court stated that:
The court must consider whether the decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a
clear error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be
searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow
one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that
of the agency.
Id. at 416.
2 See id. at 413-19.
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at the impacts of a proposed action, as mandated by the guidelines,
the inquiry is at an end.229 Under this standard, an agency's decision
is given a presumption of regularity, and the burden is on the party
challenging the agency's decision to show that it is arbitrary or
lacking a rational basis.
2 3
Decisions interpreting equitable siting guidelines for
undesirable facilities, similar to the Fair Share Criteria, illustrate the
broad degree of judicial deference accorded to agencies operating
under these guidelines. For example, New York State's mental
hygiene law mandates that residential homes for the mentally disabled
should not be overconcentrated in particular communities.2" If a
state agency seeking to locate such a residence determines that the
"nature and character" of the community in which a residence is
229 See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976). In holding that an agency
properly considered the environmental impacts of permitting strip mining in an
ecologically sensitive area, the Supreme Court stated: "The only role for a court is to
insure that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at environmental consequences; it cannot
'interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action
to be taken."' Id. (quoting NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1972); see
also Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 228 (1980);
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 548 (1978). In
Vermont Yankee, the Court held that:
[Niothing in the [Administrative Procedure Act] ... or the statutory
mandate under which the Commission operates permitted the court
to review and overturn the rule-making proceeding on the basis of
the procedural devices employed (or not employed) by the
Commission so long as the Commission employed at least the
statutory minina.
435 U.S. at 548.
.' See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415. This strong presumption of regularity is
illustrated by cases dealing with the siting of federally funded highways. See, e.g.,
Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against 1-670 v. Damian, 608 F. Supp. 110 (S.D. Ohio
1984); Smith v. Burnley, 733 F. Supp. 509 (D.R.I. 1990). An agency proposing a
highway's path must take into account the economic, social, and environmental impacts
of the proposed highway on surrounding communities, in order to assure that the burdens
of highway projects are equally distributed. 23 U.S.C. § 128 (1988). In order to justify
an agency's siting decision, public participation in locating a highway must also be
sought. Id. If the agency has considered the impacts of the highway in objective good
faith, and sought meaningful public input into its decision on where the highway should
be located, then a court will not reverse the agency's siting decision even if it has a
disproportionate effect on poor and minority-populated neighborhoods. See, e.g.,
Damian, 608 F. Supp. at 125; Smith, 733 F. Supp. at 514.
231 N.Y. MENTAL HYo. LAW § 41.34 (McKinney 1988).
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proposed to be located would be "substantially altered" by it, then
another location must be found.2"2 According to the published
decisions of the state, New York courts have not reversed any siting
decisions based on this mandate, holding that "concrete" or
"substantial" evidence of an agency's abuse of its siting discretion
must be shown.233 The weight of precedent on this issue shows that
the evidence necessary to show that an agency abused its discretion
in siting a residence for the mentally disabled is, in reality,
impossible to obtain. 3
In cases interpreting the Fair Share Criteria, and those
interpreting similar siting and other discretionary guidelines, courts
are bound by a legislature's determination that agencies should have
the final say on where burdensome facilities should be located."
Such half-hearted measures by legislatures turn equitable siting
guidelines into mere public relations programs because courts can
232 Id.
233 See, e.g., City of Kingston v. Surles, 582 N.Y.S.2d 844 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1992); City of Glen Cove v. Commissioner, 572 N.Y.S.2d 709 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1991); Town of Hempstead v. Commissioner, 565 N.Y.S.2d 938 (App. Div. 4th Dep't
1991); Collin v. Community Bd 7, 566 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1991); City of Beacon
v. Surles, 558 N.Y.S.2d 196 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1990); Town of Catskill v. Greene
Co. Chapter of the Assoc. of Retarded Children, 553 N.Y.S.2d 925 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
1990); Town of Hempstead v. Commissioner, 561 N.Y.S.2d 293 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1990); Town of Poughkeepsie v. Webb, 549 N.Y.S.2d 765 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1990);
City of Rome v. New York State Dep't of Mental Retardation, 545 N.Y.S.2d 871 (App.
Div. 4th Dep't 1989); City of Syracuse v. Surles, 549 N.Y.S.2d 308 (App. Div. 4th
Dep't 1989); Fisher v. Webb, 523 N.Y.S.2d 639 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1988); Town of
Bedford v. State of New York Office of Mental Retardation, 533 N.Y.S.2d 994 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1988); City of Newburgh v. Webb, 507 N.Y.S.2d 314 (App. Div. 3d
Dep't 1986); Town of Oyster Bay v. Office of Mental Retardation, 503 N.Y.S.2d 100
(App. Div. 2d Dep't 1986); Village of Westbury v. Prevost, 467 N.Y.S.2d 70 (App.
Div. 2d Dep't 1983); Town of Onondaga v. Introne, 438 N.Y.S.2d 407 (App. Div. 4th
Dep't 1981); Shannon v. Introne, 436 N.Y.S.2d 337 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1981); City
of Schenectady v. Coughlin, 426 N.Y.S.2d 328 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1980); Town of
Greenburgh v. Coughlin, 423 N.Y.S.2d 209 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1979). All of these
cases upheld an agency's determination to site a residence for the mentally disabled in
a particular community.
23 See supra note 233.
23s See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)
("The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."); Kleppe
v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976) ("The court cannot inteject itself within the
area of discretion of the [agency].").
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only judge an agency's compliance with the guidelines' procedure,
and not its compliance with substantive rules to fairly distribute
undesirable facilities. However, with clear expressions of legislative
intent to site burdensome facilities equitably and fairly, courts are
given more authority to independently judge, and, if necessary,
reverse inequitable and unfair siting decisions. 6  If true equitable
siting of burdensome facilities is to become a reality, then legislatures
must take serious, explicit action.
V. Conclusion
If New York City is truly committed to the principle of
equitable distribution of burdensome municipal facilities that is stated
in the new city charter,237 then the Fair Share Criteria need to be
given the full force of legislation. By following the lead of the
federal government, which is currently considering the Environmental
Equal Rights Act,238 the city government can accomplish this goal by
For example, the Endangered Species Act prohibited the siting of any government
project in the habitat of an endangered animal or plant. 16 U.S.C § 1536(a) (1976).
Applying this statute, the United States Supreme Court halted the construction of the
Tellico Dam on the Tennessee River because it would have destroyed the habitat of the
snail darter, a species of perch. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-94 (1978). Although
millions of dollars were all ready spent on this popular project, the Supreme Court held
that it had no other choice but to halt the construction of the dam because "the plain
intent of Congress in enacting [the Endangered Species Act] was to halt and reverse the
trend towards species extinction, whatever the cost." Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
Following this decision, Congress amended the Act to allow case-by-case exemptions.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(e)-(p) (1988).
237 See NEW YoRK CITY CHARTER § 203 ("The criteria shall be designed to further
the fair distribution of the burdens and benefits associated with existing facilities .... ).
m H.R. 1924, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). This bill was referred to the House
Energy and Commerce Committee on April 29, 1993, where it remains today. See Bill
Tracking Report, 1993 U.S. House of Representatives, H.R. 1924, available in LEXIS,
Codes Library, Bltrck File; H.R. REP. No. 103-882, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1995),
available in LEXIS, Codes Library, Cmtrpt File. Other pending federal legislation
intended to foster environmental equity include the following: the Environmental Justice
Act, which would "establish a program to assure nondiscriminatory compliance with all
environmental, health and safety laws and to assure equal protection of public health,"
H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1161, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); and
proposed amendments to the Solid Waste Disposal Act "to require the preparation of a
community information statement for new hazardous waste treatment or disposal
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codifying the Criteria with an explicit statement of legislative intent
to equitably distribute burdensome facilities, and by adding a self-
contained enforcement mechanism to the Criteria.
The pending Environmental Equal Rights Act, which contains
both a strong statement of legislative intent and a self-contained
enforcement mechanism, could make the fair siting of
environmentally burdensome facilities a reality.2"9 The Act contains
detailed findings of fact that plainly evidence an intent to alleviate the
overconcentration of burdensome facilities in poor and minority-
facilities," S. 533, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). For a discussion of environmental
equity legislative proposals, see Kenneth J. Hollenbeck & Stephen J. Hudik, Green
Justice; Should the Poor Inherit the Polluted?, N.J. L.J., June 6, 1994, at 10.
.19 H.R. 1924 §§ 2, 3. The Act was introduced to Congress by Representative
Collins of Illinois on April 29, 1993. See 139 CONO. REC. 1106 (Apr. 30, 1993).
Representative Collins stated the following in presenting the Act to her fellow law-
makers:
Today I am introducing the (Act] to promote equity, justice, and
community involvement in the selection of locations for waste
facilities. It gets at the heart of the need for waste facilities to be
placed only in locations which minimize the total impact on the
health and well-being of nearby residents from all sources of
contamination. The bill would establish a process for exercising our
inherent rights respecting the development and evolution of our
communities.
Id. at 1106-07. The Clinton administration is also supporting the "environmentaljustice"
movement. See John H. Cushman, Clinton to Order Pollution Policy Cleared of Bias,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1994, at Al. President Clinton signed an executive order that
would require all federal agencies to insure that their projects do not unfairly inflict
environmental harm on the poor and minorities. See Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed.
Reg. 7529 (1994). Despite the Clinton administration's support of measures to alleviate
the environmental burdens placed on poor, minority-populated communities, the
reactionary Republicans, who are now in control of Congress, will not be supportive of
the Environmental Equal Rights Act or other similar legislative proposals. See, e.g.,
Environmentalists Detail Objections to GOP Proposed Contract with America, DAILY
REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Jan. 3, 1995, at Al ("Environmental groups are taking aim at
portions of the congressional Republicans' proposed Contract With America, claiming
that the plan would hog-tie environmental regulation, undermine enforcement, and shield
enforcement."); J. Eugene Grisby III, Tunes Board of Advisors: 1994-95 Review and
Outlook; '94/'95 Trends; Need the Keys to '95? Try These; Expanding Economy May Not
Mean Jobs, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1995, at D3 ("Unfortunately, if the newly elected
Republican-controlled Congress has its way, the plight of the poor-particularly in urban
areas-will probably get worse in spite of an improving economy.").
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populated neighborhoods."4 The Act also, provides residents of
"environmentally disadvantaged communities" 2 ' with a mechanism
to force the agency proposing a facility site to determine if the facility
would have an adverse effect on the community.242 If the agency
determines that the proposed facility is slated for an "environmentally
disadvantaged community," and that the facility would have an
adverse effect on human health and the environment, then a
construction permit for the facility must be denied.243
The Environmental Equal Rights Act gives poor and minority-
populated communities a substantive tool to challenge decisions to site
burdensome facilities in their backyards by providing a forum other
than the courts, which are bound by strict standards of review,2' to
contest siting decision.24 Additionally, the Act provides a strong
indication of legislative intent to site facilities equitably, thereby
avoiding the problem of strict judicial deference to agency decision
making.246 Amending New York City's Charter similarly to include
both a self-contained enforcement device and a strong indication of
legislative intent to site undesirable facilities equitably would enhance
the city's commitment to fair share principles, and would give the
240 H.R. 1924 § 2.
24) The Act defines this term as an area within two miles of the borders of a site on
which a facility for the management of solid waste is proposed for construction and
which contains a high percentage of minorities (individuals of African, Hispanic, Asian,
Native American, Pacific Island or Native Alaskan ancestry) who are also below the
poverty line. Id. § 3(d).
242 The Act provides that:
Any citizen residing in a state in which a new facility for the
management of solid waste ... is proposed to be constructed in an
environmentally disadvantaged community may submit a petition [to
hold an administrative hearing] to the appropriate entity ...to
prevent the proposed facility from being issued a permit to be
constructed or to operate in that community.
Id. at § 3(a).
24 Id. However, the facility could still be built at the proposed location if no other
suitable sites are located in the state, the facility would not release contaminants or it
would not add to the cumulative impact of similar burdensome facilities. Id. §
3(a)(2)(A).
244 See supra pp. 236-39.
245 H.R. 1924 § 3.
246 Id. § 2; see supra pp. 236-39 (discussing judicial deference to agency decisions
under siting guidelines that lack the power of legislation).
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Fair Share Criteria true substantive effect in the courtroom.
Until such an amendment is adopted, the courts, as the poor's
and minorities' last line of defense, must enforce not only the
procedures mandated by the Fair Share Criteria, but also the goals
expressed in them to equitably distribute undesirable city facilities.247
When cases come before the courts that deal with the distribution of
society's burdens and benefits, the judiciary must prevent poor and
minority-populated communities from being the bearers of all the
noxious projects that those more comfortably situated do not want in
their backyards.248 Siting guidelines like New York City's Fair Share
Criteria need to be given real substantive effect, either by lawmakers
or the courts, in order for them to be more than a balm for the guilty
consciences of those who dump all the burdens of society on the
poor, powerless and disenfranchised.
Richard J. Rogers
247 The court in Silver v. Dinkins came close to doing just this. See 601 N.Y.S.2d
366, 372 (Sup. Ct. 1993). Although explicitly holding that the agencies failed to comply
with the Criteria's procedure, the court stated that choosing the quickest and most cost-
effective site for a proposed facility would render the Criteria "illusory," and that such
decisions would pay only "lip service" to the Criteria. Id.
24 Courts can turn to Section 203 of the city charter ("The criteria shall be designed
to further the fair distribution among communities of the burdens and benefits associated
with city facilities ...."), and Article 3 of the Fair Share Criteria ("Plan for the fair
distribution among communities of facilities .... .") as clear and unequivocable
statements of legislative intent to site facilities equitably.
